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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Environmental threats are not respectful of national 
borders.1  Hence, any one country may be effectively unable to 
protect its own environment.2  The ecological integrity of river 
basins calls for cooperation among all riparian states.  The 
Mekong River–also known as the Lancang River in China–“is the 
heart and soul of mainland Southeast Asia.”3  The Mekong River 
Basin (MRB), with a total land area of 795,000 square kilometers, 
includes parts of China, Myanmar, Vietnam, nearly one third of 
 
* This paper is based on two presentations made by the authors at the 
conferences held in Chiang Mai, Thailand by the Earth Rights International 
(ERI) and the Mekong Legal Advocacy Institute (MLAI, it is now renamed into 
the Mekong Legal Network) in 2009 and 2010.  It also incorporates views held in 
Qi Gao’s Ph.D. dissertation.  The authors would like to thank Mr. Marty 
Bergoffen and Mr. Daniel King at the MLAI (MLN) for their research 
suggestions and their coordinative and organizational job, and Dr. Carl 
Middleton at the Chulalongkorn University for kindly sharing valuable research 
resources and information.  Also, the academic support from Professor Michael 
Jeffery, QC and Professor Donna Craig at the University of Western Sydney is 
very much appreciated.  Finally, the authors appreciate the constructive views 
from Ivan Torres and the friends at the ERI and the MLAI (MLN). 
 1. U.N. Secretariat, Strengthening of Environmental and Health Aspects of 
Transportation, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 5, Inland Transport Comm., U.N. 
Doc. ECE/TRANS/2008/4 (Dec. 10, 2007). 
 2. ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 53 (2000). 
 3. Mekong/Lancang River, INT’L RIVERS, http://www.internationalrivers.org/ 
en/china/lancang-mekong-river (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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Thailand, and most of Cambodia and Laos.4  All riparian states 
within the MRB are developing countries and this region is 
densely populated—the lower MRB (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam) is home to approximately sixty million people.5  A 
high percentage of the population in the Basin is still struggling 
under the poverty line. 
China shares borders with fourteen countries and has many 
international rivers.6  In most cases, China is an upstream state.  
Over the past years, increasing international disputes concerning 
international rivers have occurred between China and other 
riparian states, such as China’s dam construction on the upper 
Mekong River and the Songhua River pollution accident.7  In 
particular, with the ongoing dam construction on the upstream of 
Mekong in China, its potential environmental impact on the other 
Mekong countries is highly profiled.8  At the time of writing, five 
dams are already completed and two are in the final stage of 
construction or getting formal approval.9 
 
 4. About the Mekong — the Land & its Resources, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N, 
http://ns1.mrcmekong.org/about_mekong/about_mekong.htm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2013). 
 5. People, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N, http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/people/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 6. See China’s Borders, CHINA BRIEFING, http://www.china-briefing.com/ 
news/specialreport/chinas-borders (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 7. A severe water pollution accident occurred on the Songhua River in mid-
November 2005 due to an explosion in a petrochemical plant (belonging to 
PetroChina) in Jilin Province, China.  PetroChina and the local government 
were criticized for concealing information regarding the discharge of chemicals 
into the river for around one week from the central government, the 
downstream governments, the affected public, and Russia.  This accident 
triggered the establishment of an emergency notification system between China 
and Russia. See generally Zou Keyuan, Transnational Cooperation for Managing 
the Control of Environmental Disputes in East Asia, 16 J. ENVTL. L. 341, 
347(2004); L. Waldron Davis, Reversing the Flow: International Law and 
Chinese Hydropower Development on the Headwaters of the Mekong River, 19 
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2-16 (2006); Wang Xiangwei, Mainland's Environmental 
Chief Sacked Over Toxic Chemical Spill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 2012, 
http://www.scmp.com/node/527660. 
 8. See Davis, supra note 7, at 2-5. 
 9. The first of these, the Manwan Dam, was completed in 1994, followed by 
Dachaoshan, Jinghong, and Nuozhadu.  In March 2010, the Xiaowan Dam was 
completed as the highest arch dam in the world.  While the Gongguoqiao Dam 
was scheduled to start operating by the end of 2012 and the Ganlanba Dam is in 
the final stage of getting formal approval, the Mengsong Dam, as the lowest of 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
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This situation is further complicated by eleven dam proposals 
on the lower Mekong River.10  Most of the concern over these 
downstream dams is their potential impact on the passage and 
breeding capacities of the Mekong’s many fish species.11  In 
addition, other issues like increased navigation and 
industrialization also put the River’s ecosystem under threat.12  
Since all riparian states located in this area are developing 
countries, the tension between economic development and 
environmental protection is fierce.  The MRB is also challenged 
by global environmental threats like climate change.  The 
downstream states of the Mekong River are among the most 
vulnerable to climate change in the world.13 
In response to the above environmental problems, 
particularly the controversial issue of Mekong mainstream dam 
construction, this paper will take a procedural perspective and 
focus on developing the mechanism of transboundary 
environmental impact assessment (TEIA) in the MRB.  
Specifically, issues like the significance of establishing TEIA and 
 
the eight dams on the cascade, was cancelled in 2007 in order to allow fish 
passage up a significant tributary to compensate for the obstructed passage past 
Jinghong (and the Ganlanba Dam in the future). See Zhongguo zai meigonghe de 
shuidian kaifa jiang chengshou gengda guoji yali [China’s Dam Construction on 
the Upper Mekong Faces Increasing International Pressure], ZHONGGUO SHUIKEJI 
WANG [CHINESE WATER TECHNOLOGY], http://www.watertech.cn/info93/Guoji.htm 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2013); Philip Hirsch, The Changing Political Dynamics of 
Dam Building on the Mekong, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 312, 317, 319 (2010); 
Kunming, Xiaowan Hydropower Station Easing Electricity Demand in YN, 
INKUNMING, Mar. 16, 2010, http://en.kunming.cn/index/content/2011-03/16/ 
content_2448960.htm. 
 10. Two of the dams are located in Cambodia and the rest in Laos (two of 
them are on the Lao-Thailand reaches of the mainstream).  Among all the 
proposals, the furthest advanced projects are the Xayaburi Dam in north-central 
Laos and the Don Sahong hydropower scheme in southern Laos near the 
Cambodia border. INT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT., STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT OF HYDROPOWER ON THE MEKONG MAINSTREAM 8, 31, 94 (2010), 
available at http://www.icem.com.au/documents/envassessment/mrc_sea_hp/ 
SEA_Final_Report_Oct_2010.pdf. 
 11. MILTON OSBORNE, LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POLICY, THE MEKONG: RIVER 
UNDER THREAT 17, 19 (2009). 
 12. See MILTON OSBORNE, LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POLICY, RIVER AT RISK: THE 
MEKONG AND THE WATER POLITICS OF CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 18, 19, 25-30 
(2004). 
 13. Climate, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N, http://www.mrcmekong.org/the-mekong- 
basin/climate/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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how to tailor and comprehend TEIA in the MRB context will be 
addressed in detail. 
II.  TEIA: A PROCEDURAL PERSPECTIVE 
A.  Background Theories 
Ever since environmental impact assessment (EIA) was first 
established in the United States via the 1969 National 
Environmental Policy Act, it has been emulated by many other 
countries.14  After decades of implementation, EIA is now 
functioning as a fundamental tool for protecting domestic 
environment.  Increasingly, EIA has been applied in a 
transboundary context to cope with the environmental effects 
that spill across borders.  Failure to conduct a TEIA is a key issue 
debated by states in the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Case,15 the MOX 
Plant Case,16 and the more recent Pulp Mills Case.17  To date, the 
strongest support for TEIA and strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) can be found in the context of the 1991 Espoo 
Convention, its 2003 SEA Protocol, and the European Union’s 
(EU) EIA and SEA Directives.  It is argued that TEIA, as an 
effective procedure “applied to evaluate environmental effects 
from proposals in one territory affecting another or which 
physically cross borders,”18 can get the public and other Mekong 
countries involved and contribute to settle regional disputes. 
 
 14. FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 2, at 52. 
 15. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 33, 34, 
36, 41, 45, 56, 125, 140 (Sep. 25); PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 170 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2009). 
 16. The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, No. 10 (Nov. 13, 
2011), available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=102; M. Bruce Volbeda, 
The MOX Plant Case: The Question of “Supplemental Jurisdiction” for 
International Environmental Claims under UNCLOS, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 211, 
219 (2006); Simon Marsden, MOX Plant and the Espoo Convention: Can Member 
State Disputes Concerning Mixed Environmental Agreements be Resolved 
Outside EC Law?, 18 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 312, 314-15 (2009). 
 17. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 203 
(Apr. 20). 
 18. Simon Marsden, China’s Experience with Transboundary Environmental 
Impact Assessment: Internal and External Dimensions and Recommendations 
for Reform of Law and Policy, Address at the 7th Colloquium of the IUCN 
Academy of Environmental Law (Nov. 4, 2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
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TEIA is supported by the concept of sustainable development.  
Although it has been generally recognized as a key concept of 
international environmental policy, its legal status remains 
highly controversial.  Instead of focusing on the concept itself, it 
is suggested that a better interpretation of sustainability is to 
focus on its components.19  For lawyers, the key point to grasp is 
probably that sustainable development is “as much about 
processes as about outcomes.”20  As reflected in policy formation, 
it is necessary to ensure the development decisions to be the 
outcome of a process which promotes sustainability.21  
Considering the fact that the integration of environmental 
protection and economic development is highly context-specific, 
TEIA certainly provides a suitable mechanism that can help 
promote sustainability in a specific context. 
With regard to transboundary rivers, the theory of integrated 
river basin management (IRBM) also provides a strong support 
for TEIA.  IRBM itself is viewed as an approach to deliver 
sustainability in the governance of shared water resources.22  
TEIA, as applied in shared water governance, can serve as a 
practical tool for considering the river basin as a whole, 
cultivating a goodwill cooperative atmosphere and achieving more 
sustainable use of freshwater resources. 
B.  The Rationale of Developing TEIA in the MRB 
More specific reasons on why it is important to develop TEIA 
in the MRB will now be articulated.  In order to address 
transboundary effects more efficiently, simply giving 
consideration to it under a domestic law is not enough, not to 
mention the fact that the existing domestic EIA legislation in the 
Mekong countries does not consider the environmental impact 
outside national border.  While domestic EIA has offered 
 
 19. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 127. 
 20. Id. at 57. 
 21. Id. at 127. 
 22. This can be discerned from the definition given by Global Water 
Partnership. See GLOBAL WATER P’SHIP, HANDBOOK FOR INTEGRATED WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN BASINS 18 (2009), available at  http://www.gwptool 
box.org/imagesstories/Docs/gwp_inbo%20handbook%20for%20iwrm%20in%20ba
sins_eng.pdf. 
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international law “with a template for bringing environmental 
values to bear on policy decisions respecting activities that are 
likely to impact the environment,”23 it is the international 
environmental law that provides a more fundamental support for 
the development of TEIA.24  TEIA, as an international 
mechanism, is necessary in the sense of getting other riparian 
states and their public involved as an indispensable element for 
the purposes of preserving the integrated ecosystem of MRB and 
to protect local people’s lifestyles. 
The values of procedure should not be neglected.  Procedure 
can be treated as an end in itself or as a means to an end.25  On 
the one hand, procedure is desirable as an end per se because of 
its valuable nature.  Openness, transparency, participation, 
accountability, and predictability constitute important 
characteristics of good governance.  On the other hand, it is also a 
means to improve the governance of shared water resources.  At 
the international level, good governance relies on cooperation in 
goodwill and a more democratic atmosphere.  As mentioned 
earlier, proper procedural requirements are an important 
element of sustainable development.  In this respect, TEIA could 
 
 23. NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
 24. Notably, the obligation not to cause environmental harm, the obligation 
to cooperate (specifically with the requirement of notification and consultation), 
and the principle of non-discrimination are often mentioned.  It is widely 
accepted that the obligation not to cause environmental harm can logically lead 
to the requirement of the assessment of potential transboundary effects of 
activities that might cause transboundary harm.  Otherwise, if harm 
subsequently occurs, states may find it very difficult to argue that they acted 
with due diligence in controlling or preventing harm that should and could have 
been foreseen.  Notification and consultation, on the other hand, are only 
meaningful if they are accompanied by sufficient information on the potential 
effects of a proposed project.  TEIA, as a source for that information, can enable 
a state to fulfill these obligations in good faith.  Moreover, the principle of non-
discrimination entails giving equivalent treatment to the domestic and 
transboundary effects of polluting or environmentally harmful activities.  
Although controversies still exist on the relationship between these background 
norms and TEIA, it is argued that each of them points to a different role that 
TEIA may play in international environmental governance. 
 25. Durwood Zaelke et al., What Reason Demands: Making Law Work for 
Sustainable Development, in MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 29, 42 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., Int’l Law 
Publishers 2005). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
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help direct the riparian states in the MRB to work more 
cooperatively towards sustainable water governance. 
The third reason is based on a practical consideration.  
Generally speaking, the development of cooperative regimes for 
the common management of international watercourses has not 
yet been sufficiently comprehensive or effective.26  Although now 
it “can be asserted with some confidence that countries are no 
longer free to pollute or otherwise destroy the ecology of a shared 
watercourse to the detriment of their neighbours,” definitive 
conclusions are difficult to draw from a legal perspective.27  Given 
the fact that both the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) show a strong 
preference for soft-law approaches and consensus building,28 and 
China is not a formal member of the two organizations, it is very 
difficult for the Mekong countries to reach any agreement on 
substantive legally-binding obligations or to secure any effective 
compliance of that.  Even if they could agree on some open-
textured norms, TEIA is also needed to attach a degree of 
normative significance to these broad substantive obligations and 
to operationalize them.  Relevant issues will be further discussed 
in detail in the next section. 
III.  DEVELOPING TEIA: A FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
Before discussing the details of TEIA, it is necessary to do a 
feasibility analysis on whether there is an enabling environment 
for the development of TEIA and how to tailor TEIA accordingly 
under specific circumstances.  On the one hand, the development 
of domestic EIA in the Mekong countries will be considered for 
the fact that domestic EIA legislation usually has a strong impact 
on the possible TEIA agreement and valuable lessons can be 
learned from the problems revealed during the domestic EIA 
practices.  On the other hand, at the international level, the 
existing intergovernmental cooperative mechanisms will be 
discussed to identify issues like whether there is enough 
 
 26. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 581. 
 27. Id. at 580-81. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
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momentum for countries to apply TEIA cooperatively and 
whether there is a suitable platform for the development of TEIA. 
A.  Domestic Dimensions  
On the positive side, domestic EIA has been established in 
almost all of the Mekong countries except in Myanmar.  In 
particular, Thailand and Vietnam incorporated provisions on EIA 
into their overarching environmental protection law, while China 
upgraded its 1998 Regulation on EIA into a specific EIA Law in 
2002 and then developed more detailed interim measures of 
public participation in EIA.29  Laos and Cambodia introduced 
EIA via a decree and a sub-decree, respectively.30  Currently, 
Vietnam is in the process of reviewing the Law on Environmental 
Protection and its provisions on EIA.  Additionally, Cambodia is 
drafting a new EIA law, the latest draft of which takes into 
account the transboundary impact.31  However, even if the future 
Cambodian EIA law did consider the transboundary impact, it is 
not applicable for most of the Mekong mainstream projects.  It 
also raises issues of reciprocity: at this stage, none of the Mekong 
countries include the transboundary impact under their domestic 
EIA legislation. 
Two procedural deficiencies are often mentioned in the 
evaluation of China’s domestic EIA legislation, namely the 
absence of alternative considerations and the low efficiency of 
public participation provisions in practice.  As will be further 
analyzed later, these two problems also widely exist, to varying 
 
 29. See Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality 
Act (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, Mar. 29, 1992) §§ 46-51 (Thai.); Law on 
Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, Nov. 29, 2005) 
arts. 18-23 (Viet.); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sep. 1, 2003) (China); Huanping 
gongzhong canyu zanxing banfa [Interim Measures of Public Participation in 
EIA] (promulgated by the State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Feb. 22, 2006) (China). 
 30. See Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (promulgated by the 
Prime Minister’s Office, Feb. 18, 2010) (Laos); Sub-Decree on Environmental 
Impact Process (promulgated by the Council of Ministers, Aug. 11, 1999) 
(Cambodia). 
 31. See Sok Phanna, Trans-boundary Aspect in the EIA Law of Cambodia, 
Address at the Mekong Legal Network 4th Regional Meeting (Jun. 29, 2012). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
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degrees, in the other Mekong countries.  Combined with the often 
criticized domestic EIA legislation and its problematic 
implementation in the MRB, it will probably be less effective to 
rely on domestic legislation to address transboundary effects.  
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the existence of 
domestic EIA legislation in most Mekong countries does provide a 
basic legal foundation and a starting point for the discussions of 
TEIA at the regional level. 
B.  Regional Dimensions  
The political relationship among the Mekong countries, 
particularly between China and the other Mekong countries, is 
very complicated and cooperation is not an easy choice.  In fact, 
whether there is enough momentum for them to cooperate on the 
governance of shared water resources has been seriously doubted 
over the years.  Currently, there are some cooperative 
mechanisms in the region which could serve as international 
platforms for developing TEIA in the MRB.  The following 
discussion will shed light on their achievements and deficiencies. 
a.  The Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
Among the three major regional cooperative regimes in the 
region, the Mekong River Commission–established among four 
downstream states since 1995–is a unique platform for 
transboundary water governance.  Its operation is based on the 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development 
of the Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement).32 
The Mekong Agreement was influenced to some extent by the 
work of the International Law Commission on drafting the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (the UN Watercourses Convention), 
which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1997.  The Agreement embraces some important 
principles in transboundary water governance, namely the 
 
 32. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin arts. 1, 5, 7, Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. I-35844 
[hereinafter Mekong Agreement]. 
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general obligation to cooperate, the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization, and the obligation not to cause significant 
harm (the term used in the text is “substantial damage”).33  It 
should be noted that the Convention has not yet entered into 
force and no Mekong country has actually signed it.34 
According to the Mekong Agreement, the four downstream 
states also aim to promote and cooperate “in the development of 
the full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian States and 
the prevention of wasteful use of Mekong waters.”35  Against the 
backdrop of this strong intention, the Mekong Agreement has 
faced criticism for being too “soft” to actually promote 
sustainability in the region.36  Most parts of the document are 
drafted in “hortatory” language,37 thus unable to be enforced due 
to the lack of legal teeth.38  In addition, studies also show that the 
Mekong Agreement has not succeeded in being implemented in 
national legislation of member states.39 
The creation of the MRC was set within an eco-political 
circumstance.40  The MRC consists of three permanent bodies: 
the Council, the Joint Committee, and the Secretariat.  However, 
its operation has been caught in a multifaceted dilemma, which 
has significantly weakened and impaired its roles and functions 
in transboundary water governance.  For one thing, there are 
notable tensions between the MRC as a donor-driven 
organization and an organization owned by riparian states.41  The 
 
 33. Id.  
 34. Fleur Johns et al., Law and the Mekong River Basin: A Socio-Legal 
Research Agenda on the Role of Hard and Soft Law in Regulating 
Transboundary Water Resources, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 154, 158 (2010). 
 35. Mekong Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
 36. Johns et al., supra note 34. 
 37. For example, there is an explicit mandatory commitment “to protect the 
environment from pollution and other harmful effects resulting from 
development plans and uses of water-related resources.” Mekong Agreement, 
supra note 32, art. 3. 
 38. PHILIP HIRSCH ET AL., UNIV. OF SYDNEY, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE MEKONG 26-27 (2006), available at 
http://sydney.edu.au/mekong/documents/mekwatgov_mainreport.pdf. 
 39. See id. at 33-42. 
 40. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 313. 
 41. Philip Hirsch, Water Governance Reform and Catchment Management in 
the Mekong Region, 15 J. ENV’T DEV. 184, 194 (2006). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
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funding of the MRC now relies primarily on foreign donors,42 and 
their changing perceptions toward the role of the MRC in 
promoting regional development often have a significant impact 
on the MRC’s work.43  As a region where “foreign interests, 
experts and donors have always played an important and at 
times dominant role,”44 recent years have witnessed an attempt 
to increase the member states’ ownership of the MRC.  This is 
represented by the attempt to riparianize all management 
positions in the MRC Secretariat by 2030, including the CEO 
position.45  Questions remain, not only on how a CEO from four 
member states will be chosen, but also regarding this CEO’s 
ability to “navigate the varied interests and drivers of 
mainstream hydropower development,” since a Mekong national 
serving as CEO “could be more susceptible to various influences 
that would constrain the independence of the MRC Secretariat 
and impact its research agenda.”46  The dominance of the MRC 
Secretariat by the donors provides a platform for them to have 
more control over the use of donor funds and express their 
ideologies about how to promote more sustainable and integrated 
water governance in the MRB.  However, this donor-driven 
pattern does create a sense of alienation of the MRC to its 
member states and in turn raises the risk of MRC being 
marginalized or bypassed in reality. 
Meanwhile, the lack of effectiveness of the donor countries on 
implementing IRBM in the MRB could be partly attributed to the 
approach donors have used to impose the concept of IRBM, which 
is disconnected with member states and most river basin users’ 
 
 42. Australia is currently the largest donor.  Other donors include, but are 
not limited to: the governments of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, and France and the World Bank. 
 43. This can be discerned in the MRC’s changing position on hydropower 
development in the region over the last two decades. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 
314-17. 
 44. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at xxi. 
 45. Nguyen Thai Lai, Deputy Minister of Natural Res. & Env’t of Viet., The 
17th Meeting of the MRC Council, Joint Meeting with the MRC Donor 
Consultative Group (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/ 
news-and-events/speeches/the-17th-meeting-of-the-mrc-council-joint-meeting-
with-the-mrc-donor-consultative-group-2/. 
 46. RICHARD P. CRONIN & TIMOTHY HAMLIN, STIMSON CTR., MEKONG TIPPING 
POINT: HYDROPOWER DAMS, HUMAN SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY 24 (2010). 
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experience, and this external pressure and rationale often fails to 
be internalized into state’s behavior.  With the ongoing 
hydropower expansion in this region, the political struggle 
between donors and member states seems to become increasingly 
critical under the framework of the MRC. 
The disconnect and tension between the MRC and national 
decision-making landscapes is also reflected in the problematic 
setting and functioning of the National Mekong Committees 
(NMC) at the domestic level.  Although the NMC is designed to 
link the MRC’s regional programs with sectoral ministries’ 
development plans and policies at the national level, in reality it 
is not consistent with the national decision-making regimes.47  
For instance, the NMC Secretariat often found it very difficult to 
arrange national consultation meetings as an inter-ministerial 
decision-making forum since the donor’s efforts on implementing 
IRBM through programs are often in conflict with sectoral 
ministries’ development interests, and the bureaucratic 
competition among diverse water sectors remains fierce, 
especially between planning authorities and environment 
authorities.48  In addition to the lack of power to promote real 
coordination between the MRC and the NMC or among 
participating ministries, the NMC is also suffering from 
shortages in human and financial resources, and not surprisingly, 
remains distant from civil society.49 
Another obvious structural limitation is that all the MRC 
formal members are downstream states, while two upstream 
states, China and Myanmar, merely maintain dialogue relations.  
So far, the only outcome from this dialogue partnership is an 
agreement on the provision of hydrological information on the 
Mekong River, under which China promises to provide water 
level data in the flood season.50  Talks are under way to expand 
 
 47. Diana Suhardiman et al., Scalar Disconnect: The Logic of Transboundary 
Water Governance in the Mekong, 25 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 1, 4 (2011). 
 48. Id. at 4, 6, 9. 
 49. NATHAN BADENOCH, WORLD RES. INST., TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 17 (2002), 
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACS660.pdf; HIRSCH ET AL., supra 
note 38, at 54, 121. 
 50. Upstream Partners, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N, http://www.mrcmekong.org/ 
about-the-mrc/upstream-partners-2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/3
  
962 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
this data sharing agreement to include dry season levels.  During 
the severe drought in 2010, China “agreed to provide water level 
data from two dams in Yunnan province” until the end of the 
drought.51  Despite the increasing engagement of China as a 
dialogue partner, it seems unlikely for China to fully accept the 
Mekong Agreement, which only reflects the consensus among 
downstream states under external influences with respect to the 
highly controversial nature of the governance of shared water 
resources, not to mention China’s negative position on the UN 
Watercourses Convention.  Moreover, combined with the existing 
tension over control of the MRC between donors and riparian 
states, China seems to be much less motivated to join the 
organization that is maybe more donor-driven than state-owned. 
Other than the innate problems of the MRC itself, its 
regional influence is also increasingly threatened by the rapid 
development of the Greater Mekong Subregion Program (GMS), 
ASEAN, and its dialogue relationship with China, which will be 
further discussed later.  In addition, a growing risk of 
marginalization of the MRC in decision-making processes can be 
attributed to the increasing involvement of foreign and domestic 
business sector as well. 
Nevertheless, the existence and the struggle of the MRC does 
provide more political opportunities for downstream states and 
the civil society in the region to raise their voices on the 
utilization of Mekong water resources.  This is represented by the 
decision to carry out a SEA on all lower Mekong mainstream dam 
proposals and the prior notification and consultation process on 
the Xayaburi Dam.52  In addition, several procedural documents 
 
 51. Apinya Wipatayotin & Theeraporn Saiwirat, China to Provide Water 
Data on Dams, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 25, 2010, http://bangkokpost.newspaper 
direct.com/epaper/viewer.aspx. 
 52. The SEA process took sixteen months to finish since May 2009.  The SEA 
report later recommended a 10-year deferral for mainstream hydropower 
development due to many of its remaining uncertainties and serious risks.  In 
addition, according to the Mekong Agreement, all lower Mekong mainstream 
dam proposals must go through the prior notification and consultation process.  
The Xayaburi Dam is the first project that triggered this process.  Detailed 
discussion on the SEA process and the Xayaburi consultation process is 
available. See Qi Gao, A Procedural Framework for Cooperative Sustainable 
Governance of Water Resources in the Mekong River Basin chs. 4(I)(B)(2), 
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were approved by member states of MRC, which include 
procedures for data and information exchange and sharing, 
procedures for water use monitoring, and procedures for 
notification, prior to consultation.53  Although they are non-
binding in nature, this form of consensus is a possible option for 
future TEIA documents. 
b.  ASEAN and ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations 
ASEAN is also involved in the Mekong issues.  In June 1996, 
a Basic Framework of ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development 
Cooperation was adopted by the ASEAN countries and China to 
strengthen economic linkages among relevant countries and to 
encourage dialogue on and identification of economic projects in 
the region.54  ASEAN has played an important role in energy 
development in the MRB.55  Considering the increasing economic 
cooperation under ASEAN and its important role in political and 
social regional stability, this broader regional economic and 
political cooperation regime can have a notable impact on the 
MRB. 
Understandably, environmental management was not 
expressly recognized as a concern when ASEAN was established 
in 1967.56  However, increased population, rapid economic 
 
6(III)(B) (Oct. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western 
Sydney) (on file with author). 
 53. Policies, Procedures and Guidelines, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N, http://www. 
mrcmekong.org/publications/policies-procedures-and-guidelines (last visited Apr. 
15, 2013). 
 54. ASEAN, BASIC FRAMEWORK OF ASEAN-MEKONG BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION (June 17, 1996), available at http://www.aseansec.org/6353.htm. 
 55. The ASEAN Power Grid Program consists of sixteen bilateral and 
multilateral electricity interconnection projects that cover many areas in the 
MRB and could pave the way to enhance intra-regional electricity trade in the 
region. Xiaojiang Yu, Regional Cooperation and Energy Development in the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 1221, 1228 (2003).  The number of 
projects listed in this paper is fourteen, while according to the more recent data, 
two more projects have been proposed. See BAMBANG HERMAWANTO, APGCC, 
REPORT OF THE 8TH MEKONG OF APGCC (June 23, 2011), available at http://www. 
hapuasecretariat.org/doc2011/Report%208_APGCC.pdf. 
 56. Kon Kheng-Lian & Nicholas A. Robinson, Regional Environmental 
Governance: Examining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Model, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 
4 (Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. Ivanova eds., 2002). 
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growth, and existing and region-wide social inequities among the 
ASEAN countries has put increasing pressures on their natural 
resources and brought to light various common or transboundary 
environmental issues.57  Environmental cooperation among the 
ASEAN countries can be traced to 1977, and the years since have 
witnessed the development of an “increasingly complex but for 
the most part non-formal web of soft-law declarations, 
resolutions, plans of action and issue-specific programs that 
together define the administrative, institutional and normative 
contours of regional environmental governance.”58 
Meanwhile, environmental cooperation has also been 
gradually developed under the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations.  
Currently, the environmental cooperation is guided by the 
ASEAN-China Environmental Protection Strategy 2009-2015, 
which specified six priority areas, including: raising public 
awareness on environmental protection and enhancing 
environmental education, promoting environmentally sound 
technology and eco-label program, biodiversity conservation, 
environmental management capacity building, global 
environmental concerns, and environmental protection industry 
and relevant programs.59  The ASEAN-China Environmental 
Cooperation Center was established by the Chinese government 
in 2010 to implement this strategy.60  Other than the priority 
areas, ASEAN and China are also seeking cooperation on 
transboundary water issues.61 
One latest development of the relationship between ASEAN 
and China is the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA) in 2010.  The ACFTA currently covers six ASEAN 
 
 57. An Overview on ASEAN Environmental Cooperation, ASEAN, http:// 
environment.asean.org/index.php?page=overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 58. Lorraine Elliott, ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation: Norms, 
Interests and Identity, 16 PAC. REV. 29, 36 (2003). 
 59. Zhongguo-Dongmeng zhuzhong Yunnan shengtai, dajian huanbao hezuo 
pingtai [China and ASEAN Set up Platform for Environmental Cooperation: 
Attention Paid to the Ecosystem in Yunnan Province], PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 11, 
2010, http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2010-06/11/content_20043796. 
htm. 
 60. Zhongguo-Dongmeng huanbao hezuo zhongxin zujian [The Establishment 
of the ASEAN-China Environmental Cooperation Center], PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 
19, 2010, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/201003/t20100319_187059.htm. 
 61. Id. 
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countries62 and China, and will be further extended to the other 
ASEAN Member States by 2015.63  The ACFTA creates an 
economic region with 1.7 billion consumers, a regional Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of about U.S. $2 trillion, and total trade 
estimated at U.S. $1.23 trillion.  This makes it the biggest free 
trade area in the world in terms of population size.64 
Guided by the concept of sustainable development, many free 
trade areas are under the process of combining environmental 
concerns with regional economic development.  In particular, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents this 
trend.  As will be discussed later, the NAFTA region has also 
taken the initiative in developing TEIA in the region.  Along with 
the future development of ACFTA, member states should further 
deepen their environmental cooperation. 
In the face of increasing regional environmental challenges 
and transboundary disputes, environmental cooperation under 
ASEAN is “[s]andwiched between and influenced by both the 
global” best practices and the regional political traditions.65  The 
latter is often referred to as the “ASEAN Way.”  As a 
collaborative approach, it is “derived from global principles and 
the local, social-cultural and political milieu in Southeast Asia.”66  
It relies on “consensus building and cooperative programs rather 
than legally binding treaties” and shows a “preference to national 
implementation of programs rather than reliance on a strong 
region-wide bureaucracy.”67  The prevailing “ASEAN Way” has 
been criticized for being too weak to actually resolve difficult 
regional issues or to secure a coordinated and effective 
 
 62. They are Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Raul L. Cordenillo, The Economic Benefits to ASEAN 
of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN, http://www. 
asean.org/resources/item/the-economic-benefits-to-asean-of-the-asean-china-
free-trade-area-acfta-by-raul-l-cordenillo (last updated Jan. 18, 2005). 
 63. ASEAN, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION BETWEEN ASEAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2002). 
 64. Cordenillo, supra note 62. 
 65. Elliott, supra note 58, at 38. 
 66. PARUEDEE NGUITRAGOOL, ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA: ASEAN’S REGIME FOR TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE POLLUTION 28-29 (Routledge 
2011). 
 67. Kheng-Lian & Robinson, supra note 56. 
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compliance of regional consensus.  Although there are some 
recent attempts to shift ASEAN towards “a rules-based and 
people-oriented organization with its own legal personality,”68 the 
entrenched “ASEAN Way” still has a profound impact on regional 
cooperation.  In fact, rule-based legal reforms at the domestic and 
regional levels in the MRB are also stagnant in many cases.69  
Even if more stringent requirements were put in place, their 
implementation in reality is often unsatisfactory.  Without a rule-
based society and culture, even the most stringent legislation 
may not be able to deliver an effective outcome.  The attempt to 
interpret and evaluate the “ASEAN Way” from a legal perspective 
using western concepts can be oversimplified and risks 
overlooking some of its pragmatic merits in the context of 
societies where the rule of law is generally weak.70 
c.  The Greater Mekong Subregion Program (GMS) 
In 1992, with assistance from the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), all riparian states of Mekong entered into a program of 
subregional economic cooperation, which set a path towards 
regional economic integration.  The GMS does not have a formal 
organization.  Instead, it holds “a cycle of ministerial meetings 
and a biennial prime ministerial summit, which they all attend 
(at the most senior political level and in large numbers) and use 
to mark their ‘ownership’ of this emerging regional institution.”71  
Functioning as a loosely structured forum, it adopts “a flexible, 
results-oriented and activity-based approach,”72 which again in 
some parts reflects the political culture of the “ASEAN Way.”  
Nine areas of cooperation have been highlighted under the GMS, 
including “agriculture, energy, environment, human resource 
 
 68. ASEAN Charter Enters into Force Next Month, ASEAN, http://www.asean 
.org/asean/asean-charter/media-releases-on-the-asean-charter/item/asean-
charter-enters-into-force-next-month-bangkok-15-november-2008 (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). 
 69. See generally Gao, supra note 52, ch. 2. 
 70. See id. at ch. 7(II). 
 71. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 53. 
 72. ASIAN DEV. BANK, MIDTERM REVIEW OF THE GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION 
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK (2002-2012) 2 (2007), available at http://www.adb.org/ 
sites/default /files/gms-sf-midterm-review.pdf. 
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development (HRD), telecommunications, transport, tourism, 
trade, and investment.”73 
To date, most of the GMS activities have targeted improving 
physical interconnectivity of the region, and around ten billion 
(U.S.) dollars worth of priority infrastructure projects have either 
been completed or are being implemented.74  In particular, 
through the GMS, the ADB has either co-financed75 or been 
involved in the construction of some hydropower dams in the 
MRB.76  In addition, with a goal of establishing a power grid, 
more than twenty hydro energy-related projects in the GMS 
involve the construction of transmission lines to transfer power 
from dams in China, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia to Thailand 
and Vietnam.77  As pointed out by Both ENDs: “[i]f the ADB does 
not build the high-voltage transmission lines, then certainly some 
of the dams will not be built at all.  At the same time, in order for 
transmission lines to be financially viable, dams must be 
constructed.”78  The MRC has little impact on their decision-
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Greater Mekong Subregion: Overview, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://beta.adb. 
org/countries/gms/overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 75. For example, the controversial Theum-Hinboun Dam and the Nam Theun 
2 Dam in Laos. See generally Philip Hirsch, Globalisation, Regionalisation and 
Local Voices: The Asian Development Bank and Re-scaled Politics of 
Environment in the Mekong Region, 22 SINGAPORE J. TROP. GEO. 237, 242-44 
(2001). 
 76. For example, the Song Bung 4 in Vietnam and the Nam Ngum 3 in Laos. 
See generally Carl Middleton et al., Old and New Hydropower Players in the 
Mekong Region: Agendas and Strategies, in CONTESTED WATERSCAPES IN THE 
MEKONG REGION: HYDROPOWER, LIVELIHOODS AND GOVERNANCE 23, 32, 38 
(François Molle et al. eds., 2009); Shannon Lawrence, The Nam Theun 2 
Controversy and Its Lessons for Laos, in CONTESTED WATERSCAPES IN THE 
MEKONG REGION: HYDROPOWER, LIVELIHOODS AND GOVERNANCE 81-112 (François 
Molle et al. eds., 2009); BOTH ENDS, THE ADB-GMS SUPPORT FOR HYDROPOWER 
DAMS AND POWER GRID: ADB AND THE GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION PROGRAM 
(2011); Project Database, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://www.adb.org/ 
Projects/summaries.asp?query=&browse=1&mode=1&ctry=LAO&sctr=3200&sct
r=3800&year=ALL (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 77. For example, the transmission lines to connect Thailand to the Jinghong 
and Nuozhadu dams on the Lancang River and dams on the Salween River in 
Myanmar; and the transmission lines to connect Thailand and Vietnam to the 
controversial Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 
155; Yu, supra note 55, at 1227. 
 78. BOTH ENDs, supra note 76. 
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making processes, especially considering the increasing of private 
investments in GMS projects. 
The GMS itself does not have any regulatory functions 
regarding the Mekong River water management.79  However, as a 
program of subregional economic integration, recent years have 
also witnessed a gradual awareness of the need to incorporate 
environment considerations into the decision-making process.80  
While the existing environmental initiative focuses mainly on 
land ecosystems, a corridor for the Mekong Headwaters and one 
for the Tonle Sap Inundation Zone are included, which raises 
another concern of functional demarcation between the MRC and 
the GMS.81  In addition, the progress in the area of 
environmental protection under the GMS is still scattered to a 
large extent and falls short of more specific arrangements to 
pursue the achievement of environmental goals.  Along with the 
burgeoning economic growth in this region, whether the 
environmental cooperation under the GMS can shift from rhetoric 
to reality remains to be seen. 
The GMS is perceived by some as a competitor to the MRC 
due to the fact that the GMS is the only regional mechanism that 
includes all six riparian states, it is rapidly developing a much 
higher profile, and is stronger than the MRC in terms of power, 
influence, ownership, and funding.82  Currently, the GMS is 
“becoming increasingly Asian and less ‘ADB-driven,’” with strong 
 
 79. OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 6. 
 80. A Working Group on Environment was established in 1995 that initially 
focused on capacity building and establishing environmental information 
systems.  Since 2005, the Meeting of the GMS Environment Ministers has been 
held every three years and the Core Environment Program was endorsed at the 
first meeting to promote a poverty-free and ecologically rich GMS, with the 
Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative set as a key component of the 
program.  It is notable that China has committed significant funding (U.S. $20 
million at least) to environmental cooperation under the GMS. GREATER 
MEKONG SUBREGION, MEETING OF THE GMS ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS: JOINT 
MINISTERIAL STATEMENT (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.wwfchina. 
org/english/downloads/GMSstatement.pdf; see also HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, 
at 64. 
 81. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 69. 
 82. Id. 
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ownership by the Mekong countries, particularly China.83  The 
GMS is also viewed to be “strongly aligned with the prevailing 
regional sentiment that is driving ASEAN-China relations and 
regional integration.”84 
In fact, despite the competitiveness between the MRC and 
the GMS in terms of regional influence, they do not have much 
direct contradiction in the area of water governance.85  Even if 
they both deal with somewhat similar issues, the GMS and MRC 
play their roles in very different approaches.  While the MRC’s 
perspective is to view the Mekong River chiefly as a natural 
resource to govern, the GMS program seems to “consider the river 
more as a symbol that defines the region in which they are 
promoting economic growth and cooperation.”86  The latter 
perspective is at least partly responsible for the ignorance of the 
Mekong River and aquatic biodiversity aspects during the 
ongoing environmental cooperation under GMS.  However, as a 
regional economic cooperation mechanism, the GMS could 
approach environmental problems in a way that is more directly 
linked to power trade and the decision-making process of specific 
development projects and has the potential to serve as a regional 
environmental platform which could better incorporate and 
comprehend the roles of non-state factors such as financiers and 
investors.  Although it can also open the door for considering 
environmental effects during the process of promoting integrative 
economic links among the riparian states, promoting TEIA 
arrangements under the GMS can be even more challenging than 
relevant developments under the MRC due to the loose structure 
of the GMS itself and its strong economic orientation. 
 
 83. Id. at 106; Evelyn Goh, China in the Mekong River Basin: The Regional 
Security Implications of Resource Development on the Lancang Jiang 8 (Inst. of 
Def. & Strategic Studies, Working Paper No. 69, 2004). 
 84. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 70. 
 85. Id. at 69. 
 86. MARKO KESKINEN, BRINGING BACK THE COMMON SENSE? INTEGRATED 
APPROACHES IN WATER MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE MEKONG 86 
(2010), available at http://users.tkk.fi/u/mkeskine/Thesis.pdf. 
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IV.  TEIA: REGIONAL EXPERIENCES 
Outside the Espoo and EU regimes,87 efforts have been made 
to promote other multilateral cooperation that may vary from one 
region to another, such as the 1997 Draft North American 
Transboundary EIA Agreement.88  The draft agreement is only a 
partly finished document with several provisions still pending 
further negotiation.89  However, the draft agreement does provide 
detailed requirements on issues like notification and information 
exchange, screening, scoping, and public participation.  
Unfortunately, the effort towards formally adopting this 
agreement has stagnated ever since.  A major divergence is that 
while the United States and Canada argue that it should only be 
applicable to the federal governments of the signatories, Mexico 
insists that any final treaty should cover the actions of state 
governments as well.90 
 
 87. EU’s EIA Directive and the Espoo Convention, together with other 
relevant agreements, including the Aarhus Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention, represent the two most institutionalized TEIA regimes in the world. 
Discussion concerning these legal documents will be incorporated into the 
detailed analysis on key issues of TEIA in Section V. 
 88. See generally COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, DRAFT NORTH AMERICAN 
AGREEMENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Dec. 2, 
1997), available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=1906& 
SiteNode ID=366. 
 89. Issues pending further discussions include, but are not limited to: 
mitigation measures, post-project monitoring, exemption, relation to existing 
bilateral mechanisms/obligations, on-going consultations, and dispute 
resolution. 
 90. Ignacia S. Moreno et al., Free Trade and the Environment: The NAFTA, 
the NAAEC and Implications for the Future, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 430 n.142 
(1999).  The most recent available information on this agreement is that on 
August 31, 2005, the Council of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
“rejected a proposal for the CEC Secretariat to prepare Case Studies on 
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment on the basis that the parties 
were seeking to negotiate a TEIA agreement through the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America.” Neil Craik, Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment in North America: Obstacles and 
Opportunities, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 93, 113-14 (Kees Bastmeijer & Timo Koivurova eds., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008); Charles M. Kersten, Rethinking 
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 173, 178 
n.36 (2009). 
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This case reflects the degree of difficulty for countries to 
achieve consensus on transboundary EIA in a regional-specific 
context outside the EU and Espoo regimes with additional 
constitutional hurdles to surmount in federalist systems of 
government.  Another potential EIA regime is the 2003 
Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Caspian Sea, which includes hortatory 
requirements on member states to “take all appropriate 
measures” to introduce and apply EIA that may have a 
significant negative impact on the marine environment of the 
Caspian Sea and to cooperate in the development of protocols on 
TEIA.91  Discussions among member states regarding this 
specific protocol are underway, and the current draft is in line 
with the Espoo Convention and the 2003 UNEP Guidelines on 
TEIA in the Caspian Sea Region.92  Difficulties remain due to 
issues such as the highly varied national EIA procedures and 
former Soviet Union countries’ unfinished reforms.93 
Interestingly, China has also taken some very initial steps 
towards TEIA.  This is represented by relevant cooperation in the 
Greater Tumen region.  The Tumen River is bordered by China, 
Russia, and North Korea and is vital for biodiversity preservation 
in the delta, as well as agricultural and industrial development in 
the region.  Water pollution from industrial sewage has now 
become one of the key priority environmental concerns.94  In 
1991, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
initiated a Tumen River Area Development Program, and a 
formal agreement was signed in December 1995 to establish a 
Consultative Commission with membership of China, North 
 
 91. This Convention is signed by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation, and Turkmenistan. See Barbara Janusz, The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, 44 
I.L.M. 257, 257, 268 (2003); Kersten, supra note 90. 
 92. Rie Tsutsumi & Kristy Robinson, Environmental Impact Assessment and 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Caspian Sea, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 53, 56-57 (Kees Bastmeijer & Timo Koivurova eds., 2008). 
 93. Id. at 61-64. 
 94. Marsden, supra note 18, at 24. 
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Korea, Mongolia, South Korea, and Russia.95  The Agreement is 
further supplemented by the 1995 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Environmental Principles Governing 
the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast 
Asia (the 1995 MoU).  In addition, at the Eighth Consultative 
Commission Meeting in 2005, a new Greater Tumen Initiative 
(GTI) was established.96  Supported by the UNDP and Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF), it now serves as “an 
intergovernmental platform for economic cooperation and 
exchanges for Northeast Asia” and “a catalyst in expanding policy 
dialogue and strengthening fundamentals for improving the 
cooperation.”97 
In particular, some common understandings on TEIA were 
recorded in the 1995 MoU.  Article 1.2 generally requires a joint 
“regional environmental assessment” for regional development 
plans for the region as a whole, and a specific mitigation plan 
needs to be prepared accordingly.98  It provides a basic provision 
on SEA, but no detailed arrangements are made on how to carry 
out such an assessment.  More specific requirements are made for 
TEIA.  Article 1.5 stipulates that an EIA and a mitigation plan 
should to be conducted and prepared for any proposed project in 
the region which may have a significant environmental impact.99  
However, no detailed list or criteria is elaborated to guide the 
screening or scoping process.  The whole EIA process will be led 
by the member state where the project is located and with the 
participation of experts from affected states.  The affected public 
and the NGOs, however, are not expressly required to be included 
in the process.  Instead, countries only agree on a broad basis to 
 
 95. Steve S. Sin, Greater Tumen Area Economic Development Project: A 
Background, NE. ASIA MATTERS (Jan. 27, 2010), http://asiamatters.blog 
spot.com/2010/01/greater-tumen-area-economic-development.html.  Another 
agreement was signed at the same time to establish a Coordination Committee 
with membership of China, Russia, and North Korea. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The Greater Tumen Initiative, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http:// 
www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&catid=1
1&topic=51&sid=4222&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 (last visited Apr. 16, 
2013). 
 98. See generally MOU on the Environment, GREATER TUMEN INITIATIVE (July 
19, 2000), http://www.tumenprogram.org/news.php?id=172. 
 99. Id. 
23
  
2013] ONLY ONE MEKONG 973 
 
“consult with, give access to information to and provide 
opportunities for involvement by affected citizens and interested 
NGOs at appropriate stages of the development and 
environmental planning processes for the region.”100  In addition, 
there are no specific arrangements on how to notify or consult 
with the affected states. 
Article 1.6 requires the results of TEIA and SEA to be “taken 
into account” in developing planning activities and the 
corresponding mitigation plans.101  Here, “due diligence” is not 
explicitly required.  Furthermore, Articles 1.7 and 2.1 simply 
state that both the SEA and EIA will be conducted “in accordance 
of internationally accepted procedures and guidelines,” and 
parties will strive to “meet the objectives of international 
environmental agreements and norms.”102  The language used 
here is very vague and impractical.  Finally, parties are required 
to provide or seek necessary funding for the preparation of TEIA 
and to carry out their other environmental responsibilities under 
this MoU. 
From the above observations, it can be concluded that, 
although the MoU briefly covers some of the key issues regarding 
TEIA, most of these provisions are very general and ambiguous, 
not to mention the fact that the MoU itself is not a legally binding 
document.  Instead of making a normative commitment, the 
whole MoU resembles more of a political statement upon which 
further negotiations can be based and is less likely to provide 
necessary guidance to any TEIA practices in reality.  This 
document reflects the degree of difficulty for developing a TEIA 
mechanism between China and other downstream states.  
Although what has been accomplished so far remains quite 
immature in many ways, it does at least provide some minimal 
commitments for China where previously there had been none. 
Further cooperation and negotiation on relevant matters 
were facilitated through the TumenNet project and Strategic 
Action Programme.  Since 2004, an annual TEIA workshop has 
 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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been held six times.103  In 2000, based on Article 1.2 of the MoU, 
the Tumen Programme undertook a long-overdue EIA for the 
development of the Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Zone 
in China, which was established in 1992 without any form of 
EIA.104  Interestingly, although the establishment of an economic 
cooperation zone should be categorized as a regional development 
plan instead of a specific project and be subject to a SEA rather 
than an EIA, this environmental assessment was in fact 
conducted based on standards and legislation on EIA.  The 
confusion can be mainly attributed to both the misguided 
understanding of EIA and the fact that there was no requirement 
for SEA in China at the time.  Since it is the EIA requirements 
that apply to “development plans,” after some hesitation, this mix 
of SEA and EIA methodology will likely still be used as an 
example regarding transboundary or joint EIA. 
This EIA study was conducted by the Chinese Research 
Academy of Environmental Sciences with the participation of one 
specialist from South Korean Academy of Environmental 
Sciences.  In the EIA report, which is open to the public only in 
English, environmental analysis focused on water issues 
(including Tumen River), pollution control, solid waste disposal, 
and ecological environment, while economic benefits were 
considered as well.105  Given the after-the-fact nature of the EIA, 
alternatives were not mentioned, although it is unsure whether 
they will be considered in future.  The outcomes of public 
participation were also included.  As outlined in the report, 
individuals in and around the economic cooperation zone 
participated mainly through questionnaires, while the approach 
of spot visits was also used.106  However, the public from the 
affected states was not consulted at all.  As a conclusion, the 
report stated that as long as the development of economic 
cooperation zone is subject to the relevant laws and fulfills the 
environmental protection measures proposed in the report, its 
 
 103. Marsden, supra note 18. 
 104. MOU on the Environment, supra note 98. 
 105. See generally CHINESE RESEARCH ACAD. OF ENVTL. SCI., ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR HUNCHUN BORDER ECONOMIC COOPERATION ZONE 106 
(2000), available at http://www.tumenprogram.org/news.php?id=375. 
 106. Id. at 98-99. 
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construction is absolutely feasible in terms of environmental 
protection.107  There is no information on whether countries 
entered into further consultation after the release of the EIA 
report. 
The EIA methodology is based on the relevant Chinese 
legislation at the time and two documents from the International 
Financial Organization regarding EIA for environmental 
protection.  The whole report makes no mention of the Espoo 
Convention or other oft-cited international documents on EIA.  In 
addition, an environmental assessment conducted subsequent to 
the establishment of the economic cooperation zone does not 
really embody the essence of what constitutes a proper EIA and is 
more akin to a post-project analysis or monitoring effort.  The 
timing of this EIA raises serious doubt on whether the whole 
gesture was merely employed to justify the decision already 
made.  In addition, this EIA falls short of active public 
participation and adequate information transparency.  The 
approach used to collect public opinion was wholly inadequate, 
and only fifty people were able to participate through 
questionnaires.  Since the affected public is not actively engaged 
in the process, it is difficult for them to fully express their 
opinions and comments on the project through formal channels.  
The public also lacks necessary information on the environmental 
issues in the region, and the government and media usually tend 
to focus on the possible economic benefits.  A large number of the 
population is not even aware of the EIA being undertaken at all.  
Moreover, although the preparation of the EIA report includes 
the participation of a South Korean expert, the governments of 
affected states and their citizens are not really involved in the 
process.  In fact, the whole assessed area does not fall outside of 
Chinese territory.108  In reality, this after-the-fact exercise can be 
characterized as a domestic EIA carried out under a regional 
development program with very limited participation from other 
states. 
After this first attempt, the project of the GTI Environmental 
Cooperation (focusing on TEIA in the Greater Tumen Region and 
 
 107. Id. at 111. 
 108. Id. at 4. 
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Environmental Standardisation in North-East Asia) was 
approved in 2007 to promote further development of TEIA.  It 
recognized that since the general ability of member states to 
produce and distribute environmental information varies 
significantly, a TEIA mechanism is necessary to evaluate the 
impact on environment of undergoing projects.109  However, with 
highly varied domestic legislation and capacity, the development 
of the transboundary mechanism at the regional level will be very 
difficult, and the implementation of such regional arrangements 
will likely to be less effective.  The project also seems to recognize 
the significance of information transparency and public 
participation for it stated that environmental information data 
should be available for public and private institutions.  In 
addition, standardized data collection procedures are promoted in 
this project.  Further, TEIA will be applied to other projects 
within the region.  At the Ninth Meeting of the Consultative 
Commission, specific projects were identified, such as the 
Mongolia-China Railway Feasibility Study (this railway will link 
Mongolia with seaports) and the Road and Harbor Project on the 
China-North Korean Border, which includes reconstruction of the 
existing trans-border road into a new road and bridge.110 
As mentioned, since 2000, China’s domestic legislation on 
EIA has undergone several important improvements.  There are 
reasons to believe that EIA, as practiced in China today, is better 
than the situation a decade ago.  However, public participation 
and the relevant information transparency remains one of the 
major problems in China’s contemporary EIA legislation and 
practice.  In addition, while the TEIA arrangements under the 
MoU and the ongoing workshops on TEIA mark a milestone in 
China’s cooperation with neighboring countries, further progress 
in this area seems to be quite limited.  It is very unlikely for 
countries in this region to agree on a more solid foundation 
 
 109. GTI Environmental Cooperation (Focusing on Trans-boundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA) in GTR and Environmental 
Standardization in North-East Asia (ESNA), GREATER TUMEN INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 
2010), http://www.tumenprogram.org/news.php?id=1012. 
 110. Marsden, supra note 18; Feasibility Study on Tumen River Water 
Protection, GREATER TUMEN INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.tumenprogram 
.org/news.php?id=1011. 
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regarding TEIA in the near future, but it is possible that TEIA 
will be increasingly applied to joint development projects in the 
region.  Russia has signed, but not yet ratified, the Espoo 
Convention.  This is a potential boost for the development of 
TEIA in the Greater Tumen region.  For China, at least the 
concept of TEIA has begun to be introduced into economic and 
environmental cooperation initiatives with neighboring countries.  
Due to different geopolitical considerations, China’s compromise 
in the Greater Tumen region cooperation does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that China will likely do the same in the 
MRB context.  However, it will certainly provide a more positive 
example for future domestic and regional discussions on whether 
and how to develop the TEIA mechanism with the participation of 
China.  Politically, China’s leaders have, on different occasions, 
declared that China would be a large country with international 
responsibility.111  Combined with its diversified interests in 
Southeast Asia,112 this political gesture may open a door for more 
constructive cooperation with other Mekong states. 
V.  DEVELOPING TEIA IN THE MRB CONTEXT 
In 2010, a severe drought in southwest China seriously 
decreased the water level in the Mekong (Lancang) River and 
exacerbated tensions between China and neighboring 
countries.113  Whether China’s management of a series of dams 
on the Mekong (Lancang) River has aggravated the crisis is the 
subject of serious concern.114  In addition, despite the conclusion 
of the MRC SEA report which recommends a 10-year deferral for 
mainstream hydropower development on the lower Mekong River 
 
 111. For example, this statement is reaffirmed by Yang Jiechi, the current and 
the tenth Foreign Minister of PRC. See Yang Jiechi, Weihu shijie heping cujin 
gongtong fazhan - jinian xinzhongguo waijiao 60zhounian [Safeguard World 
Peace, Promote Common Development - Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of 
New China's Diplomacy], QIUSHI, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/ 
tyb/zyxw/t619863.htm. 
 112. See generally Katri Makkonen, Integrated Water Resources Management 
in China, in INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 267, 287-89 (Asit K. Biswas et al. eds., 2005). 
 113. See Richard Stone, Severe Drought Puts Spotlight on Chinese Dams, 327 
SCI. 1311, 1311 (2010). 
 114. See id. 
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and the strong protest of downstream countries and various 
NGOs against the Xayaburi Dam project during its MRC 
consultation process, the Lao government finally gave the official 
green light to the Xayaburi Dam project in November 2012.115  As 
the first mainstream dam that will be built on the lower Mekong 
River, this decision will likely trigger a chain effect on the rest of 
the mainstream dam proposals. 
In order to avoid, or at least handle, such controversies better 
in the future, the development of TEIA is considered essential.  
The TEIA process requires states to consider the potential 
significant transboundary environmental impact, attempting to 
integrate environmental protection and economic development on 
a case-by-case basis.  Meanwhile, the development of civil society 
in the region demands more information transparency and public 
participation on transboundary issues.  TEIA can definitely 
provide an important legal mechanism to promote this. 
A.  Two Levels of TEIA 
The crux of the problem is how to tailor TEIA and 
comprehend it in the specific MRB context.  To deal with this 
complicated issue, it is necessary to recognize two levels of TEIA.  
On the one hand, TEIA as a notion can be referred to as a “basic 
version,” which has the general function of cultivating goodwill, 
increasing transparency, and enhancing the involvement of a 
more vibrant civil society, especially with respect to developing 
stronger NGOs.  At this level, TEIA is mainly a framework and is 
easier to be accepted by riparian states. 
On the other hand, TEIA as an institution can be referred to 
as a “classic version,” which is represented by the EU’s EIA 
Directive,116 the Espoo Convention, and other relevant 
agreements, including the Aarhus Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention.  An institutionalized TEIA certainly has a 
 
 115. Jonah Fisher, Laos Approves Xayaburi ‘Mega’ Dam on Mekong, BBC, 
Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20203072. 
 116. The EIA Directive was first adopted in 1985 via the Directive 
85/337/EEC.  It has been amended three times, 1997, 2003, and 2009, and then 
codified by Directive 2011/92/EU in December 2011. See Council Directive 
85/337/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40-48; Council Directive 2011/92/EU, 2011 O.J. 
(L 26). 
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greater chance to be effective, but consensus on such detailed 
regulation is much more difficult to achieve.  Since this issue is 
addressed with difficulty by developed countries, it is unlikely to 
be any easier to deal with in the MRB context. 
The regional experiences demonstrate that the development 
of TEIA is very controversial and time-consuming.  It took the EU 
countries around two decades to reach the position today.  It is 
notable that the amendments on the original EIA Directive 
mainly aim at increasing information transparency and 
enhancing public participation.117  The situation in the NAFTA 
region is not as optimistic as the EU’s.  In order to make a 
breakthrough of the dilemma, Craik suggested that a proper 
short-term strategy is to set out the goals and broad principles for 
TEIA, 118 namely the “basic version” referred to here.  The case of 
the Greater Tumen region further illustrates the huge barriers to 
developing TEIA in a less developed region. 
Having considered the above experiences and the situation of 
environmental cooperation in the MRB, it is more realistic at this 
stage to promote the acceptance of the general notion of TEIA 
between China and the other Mekong countries, and it is an 
essential step for further development.  To make TEIA work at 
this level, two key aspects need to be emphasized.  They are 
access to information and public participation.  It is argued that 
only by increasing transparency and involving the public 
effectively, can a TEIA get beyond justification of dams into 
actual analysis of impacts.  Meanwhile, as a part of a complete 
TEIA structure, other issues like notification and consultation, 
screening, scoping, final decision, and post-project analysis should 
also be considered.  In fact, there are discussions within the MRC 
concerning developing a non-binding procedural document on 
TEIA.  Endeavors in this area will likely be the best chance of the 
lower Mekong countries to formulate a more detailed TEIA 
 
 117. It was first amended by the Directive 97/11/EC in order to widen the 
scope, strengthen the procedural stages, and integrate the changes provided by 
the Espoo Convention, and then revised by the Directive 2003/35/EC to align the 
provisions on public participation with the Aarhus Convention.  The Directive 
2009/31/EC further applies EIA to the capture and transport of CO2 streams for 
the purposes of geological storage. 
 118. Craik, supra note 90, at 115. 
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document.  A brief discussion on SEA will also be included in this 
section.  Finally, attention will be paid to the issue of compliance.  
Aside from the relevant international law, this section will also be 
based on the domestic EIA legislation and practice in the MRB. 
B.  Screening 
The screening process determines whether an EIA process 
will be required for certain projects.119  The prevalent practice is 
that a TEIA is only necessary when activities are likely to cause a 
“significant” adverse transboundary impact.  Not much 
controversy exists regarding the term “significant,” especially 
considering the domestic EIA legislation in the MRB is generally 
in line with this threshold requirement.  The next question is 
what counts as “significant.”  The Espoo Convention clarifies the 
threshold requirement by enumerating certain types of activities 
that are subject to TEIA when they are likely to have a 
significant adverse transboundary impact, and further develops 
some general criteria to assist countries in the determination of 
the environmental significance of activities that are not included 
in the list.120 
Similar approaches are adopted under the domestic EIA 
legislation in the MRB as well.  In China, Classified Catalogue of 
Construction Projects Subject to Environmental Impact 
Assessment was issued in 2008, which specified the kind of EIA 
documents needed for various activities based on types, sizes, and 
 
 119. Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the Application and Effectiveness of the EIA Directive (Directive 85/337/EEC, as 
Amended by Directives 97/11/EC and 2003/35/EC), at 3, COM(2009) 378 final 
(July 23, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2009:0378:FIN:EN:PDF [hereinafter Report from the Commission]. 
 120. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context art 2, apps. I, III, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 
[hereinafter Convention on EIA].  In contrast, in focusing on developing regional 
standards for domestic EIA, the EIA Directive first creates a detailed list of 
projects that are automatically subject to an EIA and then identifies another set 
of projects which are left for the member states to decide whether the EIA 
procedure should be applied.  For projects enumerated in the second list, 
selection criteria are set out in the Annex III to be taken into account by 
member states. See Council Directive 2011/92/EU, supra note 116, art. 4, 
Annexes I, II, III. 
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locations.121  With respect to dam construction, two criteria are 
applied to decide whether an environmental impact report is 
needed.  One is based on size, namely those with storage volume 
of ten million m3 or more.  The other one is by location–whether 
the activities are located in certain environmental sensitivity 
areas.122  Similar requirements can be found in Thailand as well.  
The activities subject to an EIA process are categorized into seven 
groups based on types, sizes, and locations, among which the dam 
or reservoir constructions with storage volume of 100 million m3 
or more, or storage surface area fifteen square kilometers or 
more, are subject to full EIA.123  Here, the criterion of storage 
volume is not as strict as the counterparts in China, but the size 
of storage surface area is taken into consideration.  In addition, 
all types of projects located in the areas approved by the Cabinet 
as class 1 B watershed area are also required to prepare the EIA 
reports.124  Therefore, those dam constructions which do not 
satisfy the size requirement may also be subject to full EIA. 
According to the 2010 Directive on the List of Projects to 
Undertake IEE and EIA in Laos, dams and reservoirs with 
storage volume of 200 million cubic metres or more, with installed 
capacity of fifteen megawatts or more, or with a reservoir area of 
1,500 hectare or more, are subject to a full EIA.125  Although 
installed capacity is a new factor introduced into the threshold 
consideration, its standard based on the storage volume is much 
looser than that of China and Thailand, leaving ample room for 
 
 121. Huanjing baohu bu [MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Jianshexiangmu huanjingyingxiangpingjia fenlei 
guanli minglu [CLASSIFIED CATALOGUE OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS SUBJECT TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT] 4 (2008), available at http://www.mep.gov. 
cn/info/bgw/bl/200809/W020080905398664224537.pdf. 
 122. Id. 
 123. OFFICE OF NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. POLICY & PLANNING, ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THAILAND 82 (2012), available at http://www.onep.go.th/ 
eia/images/stories/inf/Environmental_Impact_Assessment_in_Thailand.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 83. 
 125. MINISTRY OF NATURAL RES. AND ENV’T OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC, DIRECTIVE ON THE LIST OF PROJECTS TO UNDERTAKE IEE AND EIA 
(2010), available at http://monre.gov.la/esia/images/download/type%20and%20 
size%20697%20pm%20wrea%2012%20mar%202010.pdf.  The relevant provision 
is translated by Manolinh Thepkhamvong and verified by Oulavanh 
Keovilignavong. 
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its national agenda to become the “battery of Southeast Asia.”  
What is even more surprising or bizarre is the threshold standard 
set according to the reservoir area; 1,500 hectares is a huge area, 
but there is no other information available to further interpret 
this criterion.  Despite the above domestic standards, the 
threshold standards adopted by the 1995 Mekong Agreement and 
the MRC Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement are in fact very different from the domestic criteria.126 
In order to address the screening issue in the Mekong 
context, several questions need to be answered first.  For one 
thing, which template will the future TEIA document in the MRB 
follow?  Is it the Espoo Convention which focuses on the 
application of EIA in a transboundary context, or the EIA 
Directive which focuses on the development of European 
standards for domestic EIA and only partially addresses the 
TEIA?  Considering the circumstances in the MRB, although 
ASEAN has attempted to standardize or harmonize member 
states’ legislation on various issues, this job remains a very 
difficult task in Southeast Asia.  Therefore, it is more likely that 
the future efforts on developing a regional EIA document will 
focus on the transboundary application of EIA.  The next issue is 
whether we should attempt to develop a TEIA document that is 
applicable to various kinds of activities, or only target water 
management of the Mekong River.  It also relates to another 
question, namely under which platform should we develop this 
mechanism: the MRC, ASEAN, GMS, or others? 
Currently, the MRC is in the process of drafting a procedural 
document on TEIA, but discussion under this platform excludes 
the participation of China or Myanmar.  In addition, since the 
MRC Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement only apply to mainstream Mekong development, it is 
likely that the future TEIA document will leave out tributary 
developments as well.  It is certainly not the most reasonable 
screening arrangement, but it is probably the most feasible under 
 
 126. See generally Mekong Agreement, supra note 32, art. 5; see also MEKONG 
RIVER COMM’N FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFICATION, PRIOR 
CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT, art. 5(1) (2003), available at http://www.mrcme 
kong.org/assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-Notification-Prior-
Consultation-Agreement.pdf. 
33
  
2013] ONLY ONE MEKONG 983 
 
the current MRC regime.  However, even this degree of consensus 
will not be easy. 
The GMS platform involves all six Mekong countries and 
deals with numerous infrastructure development projects 
regarding hydropower, but the platform itself remains loosely 
structured, operates in an obvious “ASEAN Way,” and lacks 
incentives to develop regional arrangements around this 
mechanism.  Dialogue cooperation between ASEAN and China is 
another potential stage for TEIA, but it involves too many 
countries and consensus would be difficult to achieve.  Therefore, 
a more realistic approach is to pursue relevant development 
through the MRC.  Meanwhile, it is important to try to engage 
China in the dialogues and negotiations via China’s dialogue 
relationship with the MRC or through the GMS.  Even if it is 
probably too late to conduct a TEIA for China’s hydropower 
projects on the upstream Mekong, arrangements could be made 
regarding post-project analysis or monitoring. 
C.  Scoping  
Scoping is “the stage of the EIA process that determines the 
content and extent of the matters to be covered in the 
environmental information to be submitted to a competent 
authority.”127  Scoping is another area that generally does not 
appear to have much difference between TEIA and the domestic 
EIA process.  With regard to the situation in the Mekong 
countries, the current EIA legislation in Cambodia and Thailand 
does not specify what information should be included in the full 
EIA report.  In Thailand, this is compensated for by the General 
Guidelines in Preparing EIA Report issued by the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment.128  These guidelines should 
be followed in conducting an EIA in Thailand.  In Cambodia, this 
major deficiency may be addressed by Cambodia’s future EIA 
Law.  Among the Mekong countries’ legislation, only the recently 
updated Decree on EIA in Laos includes consideration for 
 
 127. Report from the Commission, supra note 119, at 3. 
 128. See generally OFFICE OF NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. POLICY & PLANNING, 
supra note 123. 
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“appropriate alternatives.”129  Notably, according to the Thailand 
EIA Guidelines, alternatives including no-action should be 
considered.130  The lack of requirements on alternatives in most 
of the domestic EIA legislation in the MRB indicates that such 
requirements are less likely to be included in the future TEIA 
document unless the domestic legislation in this area can be 
further improved.  In addition, both China and Vietnam expressly 
require the EIA report to include the public opinion.131  Public 
participation during the EIA process will be discussed later. 
Generally speaking, none of the domestic EIA legislation in 
the MRB is as specific as the EIA Directive in terms of the 
contents of the EIA report.  For example, except in Vietnam,132 
there is no express requirement under the Mekong countries’ EIA 
legislation for a description of the forecasting methods used to 
assess the environmental impact.  Moreover, except the Laos EIA 
Decree’s explicit request for consideration of the short, long-term, 
direct, and indirect impact and the similar instructions under the 
Thailand EIA Guidelines,133 other EIA legislation includes no 
specific requirements with respect to the kinds of impact that 
should be examined.  None of the EIA legislation in the MRB 
considers cumulative effects or requires an indication of any 
difficulties or knowledge gaps encountered in carrying out the 
EIA.  However, almost all Mekong countries do require the 
 
 129. PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, DECREE 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT art. 3(2) (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/39._pm_decree_on_environmental
_impact_assessment_1_1.pdf . 
 130. OFFICE OF NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 123, at 
22. 
 131. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), art. 21 (2002) 
(China); Law on Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, 
Nov. 29, 2005), art. 20 (2005) (Viet.). 
 132. Law on Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, 
Nov. 29, 2005), art. 20(9) (2005) (Viet.). 
 133. PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, supra note 129, arts. 3(2), 12(4)(c); OFFICE OF 
NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 123, at 22. 
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inclusion of an outline of, or suggestions for, ongoing monitoring 
and management plans.134 
The above deficiencies in domestic requirements on scoping 
have a negative impact on the effectiveness of EIA in each 
country to varying degrees.  The differences in domestic 
legislation on this issue increase the difficulty for reaching 
specific regional consensus in this area.  Notably, the Laos EIA 
Decree appears more favorable in several aspects of the scoping 
issue, but the effectiveness of these provisions in practice remains 
doubtful.  Generally speaking, it is very likely that countries will 
only reach agreement on some minimal requirements with 
respect to the contents of a TEIA report.  The requirements may 
resemble the provisions under the Espoo Convention but probably 
will not include several criteria that countries have not accepted 
under their domestic EIA legislation.  Nevertheless, there 
remains a possibility that transboundary application of EIA may 
transcend domestic practice as a result of the influences and 
pressures mandated by foreign donors and investors.  If this 
proves to be the case, it may contribute to future review and 
revision of the domestic legislation on EIA and may facilitate 
more effective implementation according to more stringent 
international standards. 
D.  Notification and Consultation  
Notification is the first major step taken by the relevant 
countries during a TEIA process.  According to the Espoo 
Convention and the EIA Directive, in case a proposed activity 
may cause a significant transboundary impact, the state of origin 
shall notify any affected state “as early as possible and no later 
than when informing its own public.”135  This provision applies 
 
 134. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), art. 17(F) (2002) 
(China); PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, supra note 129, art. 13; Law on 
Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, Nov. 29, 2005), 
art. 20(6) (2005) (Viet.); OFFICE OF NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. POLICY & PLANNING, 
supra note 123, at 23. 
 135. Convention on EIA, supra note 120, art. 3(1); see also Council Directive 
2011/92/EU, supra note 116, art. 7(1). 
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the non-discrimination principle to address the issue of who 
should receive notification and when.  This procedure is designed 
to trigger a timely response on certain projects.  One negative 
example in this area is China’s dam construction plans on the 
upper reaches of the Mekong, of which other riparian states were 
not been formally notified.  It was “not until the mid-1990s that 
there was any general awareness of the scope of China’s plans,” 
and by then the first dam (Manwan) was almost completed and 
the construction of the second one (Dachaoshan) was about to 
begin.136 
The timing of the notification is crucial.  According to the 
MRC Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement, member states are required to notify “in a timely 
manner prior to implementation,”137 but this timing requirement 
is criticized for being too vague.  In addition, it should be noted 
that this MRC procedural document deals with the notification 
issue in general instead of considering it as a part of the TEIA 
process.  The broader obligation to notify actually occurs after any 
domestic EIA has been undertaken.  The TEIA procedure, 
however, is supposed to be integrated with any domestic EIA 
process.  Hence, notification as a part of the TEIA procedure 
should in fact occur at a much earlier time.  The non-
discrimination principle thus serves as a practical linkage 
between the domestic EIA procedures and the TEIA process. 
Nevertheless, it is less likely that the Mekong countries can 
agree to use the timing of “informing its own public” as the 
trigger for notification.  As will be discussed later, information 
transparency and public participation are far from satisfactory in 
the region, and there is as yet no formal regional consensus on 
public participation.  Considering the necessity to differentiate 
two kinds of notification, it is recommended that, at the very 
least, the future TEIA document should link the TEIA process 
with the domestic EIA procedure and require the affected states 
and their public to be notified during the corresponding domestic 
EIA process.  This approach is supported by the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Pulp Mills Case, which 
 
 136. OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 11. 
 137. MEKONG RIVER COMM’N FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 126, art. 4.5. 
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stated unequivocally that the duty to inform “become applicable 
at the stage when the relevant authority has had the project 
referred to it with the aim of obtaining initial environmental 
authorization and before the granting of that authorization.”138 
The content of notification is important as well.  Sufficient 
information could serve as a good foundation for public 
participation and consultation.  In particular, the EIA Directive 
now reflects a combination of the requirements under both the 
Espoo Convention and the Aarhus Convention.  According to the 
Directive, along with the notification, at least the following 
information should be provided: a description of the project, 
available information on its potential transboundary impact, 
information on the nature of the decision, and reasonable time for 
the notified state to respond.139  In order to ensure information 
transparency for effective consultation with the affected states 
and their public, a certain degree of protection of the domestic 
public’s right to know and participate is logically essential. 
The Espoo Convention further requires the state of origin to 
enter into consultations with the affected state without undue 
delay after the completion of the EIA report.140  The EIA 
Directive, however, does not specify when the consultation should 
be held, implying that it can occur prior to the completion of the 
EIA report.  Since the consultation with the public of the affected 
state often occurs in conjunction with the consultation process 
among states, it is clear that the Espoo Convention does not 
provide an opportunity for the public to participate during the 
scoping or report preparation stages of the EIA.141  The Aarhus 
Convention and the EIA Directive are not explicit on this issue.  
Compared to the Directive, the Espoo Convention further sets out 
several issues that may be included in the consultation, such as 
possible alternatives and measures to monitor the effects of 
preventive measures.  Although it is commendable for mentioning 
these issues, the Espoo Convention does not require the 
consideration of them during consultation.  Moreover, countries 
 
 138. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 105 
(Apr. 20). 
 139. Council Directive 2011/92/EU, supra note 116, art. 7(1). 
 140. Convention on EIA, supra note 120, art. 5. 
 141. CRAIK, supra note 23, at 143. 
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are required to agree on a reasonable time-frame for the duration 
of the consultation period, but there is no further explanation on 
what counts as reasonable and no minimum standard is set.  This 
is in contrast with the provisions under the UN Watercourses 
Convention, which stipulates six months as a minimum period for 
consultation, and this period can be extended by unanimous 
decision.142 
It is argued that future consultation requirements for TEIA 
in the Mekong region, particularly the document prepared under 
the MRC platform, should be combined with the broader 
consultation process under the international watercourse law.  
For example, this process should include consideration of both the 
factual findings of the TEIA report and a broader agenda to reach 
agreement on a particular project.  However, due to the 
deficiencies of the existing MRC procedural requirements on 
consultation, especially with respect to the time-frame and the 
provision of information,143 future provisions on consultation 
during the TEIA process do not necessarily have to mirror the 
existing document.  It is suggested that consultation should be 
encouraged and welcomed even prior to the completion of the EIA 
report.  With respect to China, consultation in a general sense is 
also an oft-used approach during transboundary cooperation on 
water management with countries like Russia and 
Kazakhstan.144  If China was able to agree on any form of 
transboundary EIA commitment, the introduction of a 
consultation process is less likely to be a highly disputed issue.  
However, at this stage, it may be difficult to agree on specific or 
relatively detailed provisions. 
E.  Access to Information and Public Participation  
According to Principle No. 2 of the Dublin Statement on 
Water and Sustainable Development’s Guiding Principles, “water 
development and management should be based on a participatory 
 
 142. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 
49, U.N. Doc. A/51/869, art. 13 (May 21, 1997). 
 143. See Gao, supra note 52, ch. 4(I)(B). 
 144. See id. at ch. 4(I)(B)(3). 
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approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all 
levels.”145  Public participation is democratic in nature and is 
viewed as a guiding principle underpinning IRBM.  At the 
international level, the Espoo Convention only requires the 
member states to provide an opportunity to the affected public 
(equal treatment for domestic public and the public of the affected 
states) to participate and to ensure relevant information 
transparency.146  The current version of the EIA Directive (2011) 
is much more advanced in this area since it incorporates the 
contents of the Aarhus Convention.147  In particular, most of the 
relevant provisions focus on addressing the issue of informing the 
public.  This is reflected at different stages of the EIA procedure: 
during the screening process (Article 4), during notification (in a 
transboundary context) (Article 7), before and after the 
preparation of the EIA documentation (Articles 5 and 6), and 
after the final decision is made (Article 9).148  In addition, 
information relating to the decision granting any exemption of 
the Directive and the reasons for granting it should be made 
available to the public (Article 2).149 
Other than the broad coverage of information disclosure 
requirements throughout the EIA process, minimum standards 
are set for the kinds of information that should be made available 
to the public.  This includes information regarding the nature of 
the possible decisions, the fact that the project is subject to EIA 
and public participation, information that should be revealed in 
 
 145. In January 1992, a water conference took place in Dublin in preparation 
for Rio and resulted in the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable 
Development (Dublin Statement), including the Dublin Principles. The Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL 
ORG., http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 146. Convention on EIA, supra note 120, arts. 2(6), 3(8), 4(2). 
 147. As observed by Craik, the relationship between the Aarhus Convention 
and the Espoo Convention is not explicit.  But since the Aarhus Convention 
contains a provision that applies to activities subject to EIA procedures under 
national legislation, the member states are required to apply the Aarhus 
Convention for “any activity subject to a national EIA process regardless of 
whether it is otherwise enumerated in Appendix I to the Espoo Convention.” 
CRAIK, supra note 23, at 148-49. 
 148. Council Directive 2011/92/EU, supra note 116. 
 149. Id. art. 2. 
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the EIA report, details of the arrangements for public 
participation and the relevant information disclosure process, and 
the content and reasons of the final decision.150  Two criteria are 
set for the timing of information disclosure: (1) early in the 
decision-making procedures and, at the latest, as soon as 
information can reasonably be provided; and (2) within 
reasonable time-frames.151  Details for informing the public are 
left to the discretion of the member states.  The provisions under 
the EIA Directive on the obligation to inform the public are 
largely derived from the Aarhus Convention but are better 
integrated with the domestic and transboundary EIA procedure. 
Compared to the requirements on informing the public, the 
provisions on public participation are much more general.  The 
public should be provided with early and effective opportunities 
to participate and express their opinions when all options are 
open before the decision is taken.152  Considering the diversity of 
domestic legislation on this issue, detailed arrangements with 
respect to public participation shall be determined by member 
states, including reasonable time-frames for the different phases 
to allow sufficient time for informing the public and for the public 
concerned to prepare and participate effectively.  The information 
and comments gathered through the participation process should 
be taken into account during the decision-making.153  Technically 
speaking, the Aarhus Convention is more stringent by requiring 
the member state to take due account of public opinions.154  
Another issue only addressed by the Aarhus Convention is that, 
where appropriate, in case a specific activity is reconsidered or 
updated in terms of the operating conditions, the public 
participation requirements should also be applied mutatis 
mutandis.155  Therefore, post-project analysis can be also subject 
to public participation.  Further, both the EIA Directive and the 
 
 150. Id. arts. 5, 6, 7, 9. 
 151. Id. art. 6. 
 152. Id. art. 6(4). 
 153. Id. art. 8. 
 154. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 6(8), June 25, 1998, 
2161 U.N.T.S. 447. 
 155. Id. art. 6(10). 
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Aarhus Convention require the member states to ensure the 
public’s right of access to justice regarding the public 
participation provisions.156 
Based on the above provisions, it is clear that while there are 
relatively more international standards on the obligation to 
inform the public, details regarding the obligation to consult with 
the public during the EIA procedure remain largely left to the 
discretion of the member states.  Therefore, the domestic 
development of public participation, both in general and 
specifically on proposed activities, still plays a dominate role in 
ensuring effective participation in each member state.  However, 
the increasing recognition of the procedural rights at the 
international level is also valuable in setting international 
benchmarks and principles. 
Currently, there are no regional arrangements among the 
Mekong countries on the obligation to inform and consult the 
public, except some stakeholder participation policies and 
communication strategies regarding the operation of the MRC 
(not the member states) and the relevant policies under the 
World Bank, the ADB, and other multilateral funding 
institutions.  Despite the relatively better status of transparency 
and public engagement during the operation of the MRC than 
most of its member states, many problems with the MRC policies 
regarding access to information and public participation can still 
be identified.  For example, the current major approach of 
information disclosure (electronic databases) under the MRC 
remains distant from local communities and accessibility to 
information for them still needs to be improved; the 
misunderstanding in the usage of the term “public participation” 
when it actually refers to more broad stakeholder participation, 
which also involves the governments and business sectors; no 
differentiation of specific activities between the more general 
plans, programs, and policies when applying the public 
participation strategies; the participation agenda is very much 
disconnected to the situation in the field; limited attention given 
to the directly affected people (compared to NGOs); and lower 
 
 156. Id. art. 9(2); Council Directive 2011/92/EU, supra note 116, art. 11(1). 
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degrees of participation according to Arnstein’s ladder.157  In 
addition, the lack of real influence on water development 
decision-making by the MRC creates a more fundamental 
challenge to the effectiveness of public participation under the 
MRC regime.  Whilst there are merits in continuing to promote 
public participation and information transparency under the 
MRC platform, especially with regard to the drafting of the TEIA 
document, more fundamental challenges lie in the relevant 
political and legal reforms at the domestic level. 
The major deficiencies of public participation in the Mekong 
countries include, but are not limited to, the following examples.  
The Mekong countries tend to interpret and apply exemption 
clauses in a broad sense, especially with regard to national 
security and even the so-called national stability (represented by 
the status quo in China).158  The biggest legal obstacle for China 
to share flow information of the Mekong River actually comes 
from its domestic regulation, according to which the hydrologic 
data, water resources development and utilization information, 
river basin plans, and certain information about hydroelectric 
project are all confidential in the case of a transboundary river, 
unless certain international agreements exist.159  While such 
information is not even accessible to its own public, it is even 
more difficult to get the Chinese government to share such 
information with other riparian states and public.  Although an 
increasing domestic demand for transparency has put more 
pressure on the Chinese government and the current legislation 
for the lower Mekong countries, the only possible way to 
overcome this legal barrier is to achieve further agreements with 
China on sharing relevant information. 
Public participation across the region is challenged by 
diversified, often problematic, domestic legislation, restricted 
 
 157. At the risk of oversimplification, the ladder indicates different degrees of 
public participation from the perspective of power relationships between the 
public and those holding or exercising the power. See Sherry R. Arnstein, A 
Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLANNING ASSOC. 216 (1969). 
 158. See Gao, supra note 52, ch. 5(III)(B)(1). 
 159. See Shuili gongzuo zhong guojiamimi jiqi miji juti fanwei de guiding 
[Regulations on State Confidentiality in Water Resources Management and its 
Specific Scope and Security Classification] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Water Res. and State Secrets Bureau, Dec. 29, 2000), arts. 3, 4 (China). 
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political freedom, and civil society development.  Other than some 
strict, but general, provisions under the 1997 and 2007 
Constitution, and the 1992 Enhancement and Conservation of 
National Environmental Quality Act, Thailand has not yet 
expressly incorporated public participation into its EIA 
provisions.  However, compared to the other Mekong countries, it 
has the most vibrant civil society and enjoys more political 
tolerance for implementing public participation.  China probably 
has the most specific arrangements in this aspect among all the 
Mekong countries,160 but they are heavily criticized for not 
enough information transparency,161 late involvement by the 
public, and a short time-frame allowed for participation.  The 
recently updated Laos EIA Decree (under the influence of foreign 
donors and investors) adopts some strong provisions on public 
participation,162 but the political reform towards effective 
implementation is very restricted. 
Vietnam has some minimal requirements on information 
disclosure and the requirement that the public opinion should be 
included in the EIA report,163 but the requirements still fall short 
of more specific legislation and more open political tolerance.  
Cambodia only has some hortatory provisions on public 
participation during the EIA process, but is likely to develop more 
specific provisions on public participation in future EIA 
 
 160. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), arts. 5, 21 (China); 
Huanping gongzhong canyu zanxing banfa [Interim Measures of Public 
Participation in EIA] (promulgated by the State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Feb. 22, 
2006), arts. 1-32 (China); Huanjing baohu bu [Ministry of Envtl. Prot. of the 
People’s Republic of China], Huanjingyingxiangpingjia jishu daoze: gongzhong 
canyu (zhengqiu yijian gao) [Technical Guideline for Public Participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment (Draft for Comments)] (Jan. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.es.org.cn/download/2011/1-6/2135-1.pdf. 
 161. In particular, only the summary, instead of the full report of the EIA, is 
required to be disclosed and the public do not have access to the responses of 
their comments. 
 162. Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (promulgated by the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Feb. 18, 2010), arts. 7, 8 (Laos). 
 163. Law on Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, 
Nov. 29, 2005), arts. 20, 21 (Viet.). 
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legislation.164  With an exception of Thailand, other Mekong 
countries fall short of formal recognition of access to information 
and public participation as rights under the existing legislation.  
In addition, civil society development in most Mekong countries is 
constrained or underdeveloped to varying degrees, reflected in the 
fact that: “civil society” is still a relatively new concept and theory 
to these countries, the lack of awareness of the general public on 
their participation rights, unclear separation of civil society 
organizations with the government and business sectors, various 
restrictions on the formation, registration, management, and 
operation of NGOs, and the lack of free media.165 
The public also has a relatively weak ability to participate, 
and the governments or developers fall short of the necessary 
capacity and willingness to facilitate participation.  This includes 
the lack of confidence, training and education (basic education 
and professional knowledge), necessary infrastructure, and 
economic resources.  In addition, there is a prevalent feature of 
formality in existing participation practices, and the notable gaps 
still exist between the legislation and the situation in the field.  
The tokenism of implementation is very detrimental for the 
confidence and activeness of the public to participate via this 
newly emerging mechanism.  Since the concept of access to justice 
is not very well developed or entrenched, public opinion is either 
restricted or more likely to be expressed though more violent and 
non-conventional methods.166  Further, the development of public 
participation on proposed activities often falls short of necessary 
support from other levels of participation (i.e. plans and 
legislation), and the status of information transparency in most of 
the Mekong countries remains far from satisfactory, in part a 
result of varying degrees of immature representative democracy 
and the establishment of rule of law across the region. 
 
 164. Sub-Decree on Environmental Impact Process (promulgated by the 
Council of Ministers, Aug. 11, 1999), art. 1 (Cambodia). 
 165. See Gao, supra note 52, ch. 5(III)(B). 
 166. A typical case is the mass public protest (resembling a riot) against a 
planned molybdenum copper plant that occurred in Shifang, Sichuang Province 
in early July 2012. China Morning Round-Up: Shifang Protest, BBC, July 4, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18700819. 
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Nevertheless, it should also be recognized that public 
participation during the EIA process is taking a leading role in 
promoting legal reforms towards deliberative democracy.  The 
growth of environmental NGOs is the most vibrant aspect of civil 
society development, and their operation is relatively less 
sensitive compared to other areas involving advocacy.  For most 
Mekong countries, public participation during the EIA process is 
a breakthrough point for a wider or expanded application of this 
mechanism at different levels of decision-making in the future.  
Major historical impediments created by the political and legal 
environment cannot be overcome overnight, and it is important to 
fully utilize the existing opportunities to raise awareness, to gain 
more experience in the field, and to continue with political 
reform.  While top-down processes remain vital to encourage 
future reforms, bottom-up approaches should attract at least 
equal attention.  In addition to efforts in promoting public 
participation at the national level, it is argued that at least some 
general principles regarding public participation should be 
included in the regional arrangements on TEIA.  Considering the 
fact that Laos is likely to be the state of origin for most projects 
that may be subject to a TEIA, its recently updated provisions on 
public participation for domestic EIAs can provide a necessary 
foundation for future negotiations.  Although the relevant 
legislation in Vietnam and Cambodia is much less strong or 
specific, their downstream status can create incentives for them 
to apply more stringent requirements on public participation to 
strengthen TEIA methodology.  Meanwhile, disincentives like 
other geopolitical concerns (such as Vietnam’s intention to win 
support from Laos on its territorial disputes with China in the 
South China Sea) and domestic obstacles impeding relevant 
reforms should not be overlooked.  With regard to China, its past 
transboundary cooperation has not yet included public 
participation, except a very general and opaque reference in the 
case of Greater Tumen region. 
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F.  Final Decision and Post-Project Analysis 
The right to make a final decision on whether to approve a 
proposed activity belongs to the state of origin.167  According to 
the Espoo Convention, the authority is not obliged to follow the 
recommendation of a TEIA report, but should take due account of 
the report, as well as opinions gained through consultation with 
the public and the affected states.168  In addition, countries are 
still bound by the general obligation to prevent harm and to 
cooperate.169  Aside from this, it is also necessary for the state of 
origin to notify the final decision to the affected state.170  
Consultation should be introduced into the final decision-making 
process and provide an opportunity for countries to reach 
agreement on the proposed activity before, not after, any final 
decision is made. 
Final decision is not the end of the TEIA process.  Both 
international instruments and domestic legislation tend to 
include some post-project measures to monitor and review the 
actual impact and to cope with uncertainties.  Considering the 
continuous feature of environmental governance, post-project 
analysis is a good complement to the beforehand evaluation.  
Depending on the outcome of the post-project analysis, further 
consultation may be needed to deal with the situation 
cooperatively.  So far, post-project analysis and monitoring is 
included in the EIA legislation in China, Vietnam, and Laos.171 
Post-project analysis is not a compulsory procedure under the 
Espoo Convention because of the variations on this issue among 
its member states.  In the MRB context, at least, it is necessary to 
include this issue during negotiation.  Post-project analysis is an 
important mechanism for future cooperation between China and 
 
 167. Convention on EIA, supra note 120, art. 2. 
 168. Id. arts. 2, 5, 6. 
 169. Id. art. 2. 
 170. Id. art. 2(4). 
 171. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), arts. 24-28 (China); 
Law on Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, Nov. 29, 
2005), art. 23 (Viet.); Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment 
(promulgated by the Prime Minister’s Office, Feb. 18, 2010), arts. 22-25 (Laos). 
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other Mekong countries regarding its mainstream hydropower 
projects.  China does have relatively detailed provisions on this 
issue, but the public has not yet been involved in this process.  
Even if countries may not agree on post-project analysis to be 
included as a part of the TEIA document, joint monitoring and 
study between China and the other Mekong countries is a 
promising approach to deepen the cooperation on transboundary 
water management. 
G.  Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)  
More recently, SEA has emerged as a response to the 
criticism that EIA often comes late in the planning process when 
economic benefits are already well defined and by which time it is 
difficult to analyze the potential environmental impact 
rigorously.  Therefore, it is argued that environmental evaluation 
should be employed and integrated into a more comprehensive 
decision-making process.  This often refers to plans, programs, 
and, to a lesser extent, policies.  The valuable role of SEA is also 
recognized as a promising approach to tackling global 
environmental concerns like climate change.172  As noted earlier, 
the Mekong downstream countries are among the most 
vulnerable to climate change in the world.  Facing this global 
challenge, it is necessary to consider its regional impacts on the 
MRB and arrange certain procedures to respond to it.  From these 
two perspectives, SEA should be further developed in this region.  
Compared to well-developed EIA processes, however, SEA is still 
a relatively new concept, and the experience on the application of 
domestic SEA beyond the state remains very limited.  The most 
important international documents in this area are the EU’s SEA 
Directive and the UNECE SEA Protocol to the Espoo Convention 
(SEA Protocol).  The latter finally entered into force in July 2010.  
At this stage, international obligations only cover SEA of plans 
 
 172. See Wolfgang Wende et al., Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in 
Strategic Environmental Assessment, 32 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESS. REV. 88 (2012).  
Another linkage between EIA and climate change is reflected in the EU 
Directive 2009/31/EC which applies EIA to the capture and transport of CO2 
streams for the purposes of geological storage. Council Directive 2009/31/EC, 
2009 O.J. (L 140) 114. 
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and programs, while SEA of policies and legislation is only 
mentioned on a voluntary basis.173 
Among all six Mekong countries, only China and Vietnam 
have legislated SEA as a compulsory legal mechanism for certain 
kinds of strategies and plans.174  It should be noted, however, 
that when China planned the Lancang cascade in the 1980s and 
1990s, there was no requirement for SEA.  Even if there had 
been, the situation would have been the same as the case of the 
Nu River hydropower planning, in which the Chinese government 
denied the public from having access to the SEA report due to the 
confidentiality of certain information regarding international 
rivers.  Vietnam, on the other hand, does not have any Mekong 
mainstream dam plans.  Therefore, the domestic SEA procedure 
cannot be applied to mainstream hydropower development on the 
Mekong River.  With regard to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, a 
few pilot SEAs have been done in the past.175  However, a lack of 
political will, relevant legislation, and necessary capacity 
ultimately reduces the chances of effective implementation for 
domestic SEA pilot practices.  The World Bank176 and the GMS 
program177 have adopted the SEA as a method or as a part of 
environmental protection programs.  To date, two SEAs have 
 
 173. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, art. 13, U.N. 
Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2 (May 21, 2003). 
 174. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa 
[Environmental Impact Assessment Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), arts. 7-15 (China); 
Guihua huanjing yingxiang pingjia tiaoli [Regulations on Environmental Impact 
Assessment of Planning] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 12, 2009) 
(China); Law on Environmental Protection (promulgated by the Nat’l Assembly, 
Nov. 29, 2005) at arts. 14-17 (Viet.). 
 175. See INT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 10. 
 176. See generally Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/1RT0P09R80 (last visited at Apr. 20, 2013); WORLD 
BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS: PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/EIA&SEA-regional-review 
.pdf. 
 177. Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA), GREATER MEKONG 
SUBREGION ENV’T OPERATIONS CTR., http://www.gms-eoc.org/strategic-environ 
mental-assessments (last visited at Apr. 20, 2013). 
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been completed for power development planning in Vietnam, and 
energy sector SEA capacity building is being undertaken in Laos, 
which aims to increase awareness and build capacity for the 
application of SEA to energy sector planning.178  Meanwhile, the 
GMS is also “supporting the GMS Regional Power Trade 
Coordination Committee (RPTCC) [desire] to apply SEA in 
regional power trade planning.”179  Therefore, they can–at least–
play an important role in promoting SEA practices in the lower 
Mekong countries through their projects and programs.180 
In May 2009, the MRC Secretariat (with the approval from 
the Joint Committee) commissioned the International Centre for 
Environmental Management (ICEM, an Australian background 
independent technical service center) to conduct a SEA report for 
all proposed mainstream hydropower project in the lower MRB, 
which took sixteen months to finish.181  Although most of these 
dam projects are in Laos or on the Lao-Thailand reaches of the 
mainstream, the SEA process was not led by the Lao government.  
Instead, it was the MRC Secretariat and the ICEM that played a 
key role in conducting the research and organizing dialogues.  
Notable information gaps and uncertainties were expressly 
stressed in the SEA findings and the report specifically 
recommends a ten year deferral for mainstream hydropower 
development.182  It is argued, however, that the whole process 
may have been started too late considering the fact that the 
 
 178. Strategic Environmental Assessments of Economic Sector Strategies and 
Corridors, GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION ENV’T OPERATIONS CTR., http://team. 
gms-eoc.org/index.php/activities/sea.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
 179. GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION ENV’T OPERATIONS CTR., THE CORE 
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION CORRIDORS INITIATIVE 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2011 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.gmseoc.org/uploads/resources/117/attachment/CEPBCI%20Progress
%20Report%20April-Sept%202011.pdf. 
 180. See Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA), supra note 177; Bruce 
Dunn et al., Vietnam: Strategic Environmental Assessment on the Quang Nam 
Hydropower Plan, in STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 
PRACTICE: A REVIEW OF RECENT EXPERIENCE 29 (OECD Publishing 2012). 
 181. INT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 10, at 4.  The SEA process also 
included the participation of China through the high level Ecosystem Study 
Commission for International Rivers. 
 182. Id. at 137. 
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Xayaburi Dam was already close to its final stage of planning and 
preparation when the SEA process was initiated. 
While the above case sets a precedent for other plans in the 
region that may have a transboundary impact, so far it looks less 
likely that it will become a mechanism that can be sustained in 
future development practices of the lower Mekong countries.  
There is no general commitment for transboundary SEA among 
Mekong countries, and there are no specific arrangements or 
guideline documents available for pilot practices in a 
transboundary context.  This is further complicated by the fact 
that infrastructure developments which may have a 
transboundary impact or as a part of a regional development 
strategy (such as roads, railways, electricity transmissions lines, 
hydropower projects) are often initiated under different 
cooperation regimes and are funded by different international 
and domestic investors.  Therefore, it is very difficult to apply 
unified standards at the regional level to cover development 
framework for the entire plan or program that should be subject 
to one comprehensive SEA, not to mention developing regional 
arrangements that are applicable for all development plans that 
may have significant environmental effects.  In addition, the 
polycentric feature of regional water cooperation and the danger 
of MRC’s marginalization also add uncertainties to the future 
development in this aspect. 
With regard to future development of SEA in the MRB 
context, the most obvious task is to legislate on the SEA 
procedure in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.  
However, considering the problematic SEA legislation and 
practice in China and Vietnam,183 even if the SEA procedure can 
become a compulsory legal procedure in other Mekong countries, 
the effectiveness of the SEA procedure will be less likely to 
improve significantly in the near future.  In light of the current 
development of hydropower projects on the lower Mekong 
mainstream, a more urgent matter is to introduce the TEIA 
procedure at the regional level.  Meanwhile, it is necessary to 
encourage more SEA practices in this region so that more 
valuable experiences and lessons can be gained to contribute to a 
 
 183. See generally Gao, supra note 52, ch. 6(III)(A). 
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better-designed SEA in the future.  During this process, effective 
public participation and consultation should be emphasized. 
H.  Compliance  
Compliance is an ongoing process, which refers to “a state of 
conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and specified 
rule.”184  As an international regime for TEIA, the Espoo 
Convention addresses the issue by requiring regular meetings of 
parties, information exchange, self-reporting evaluation, 
encouraging implementation via new bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, developing research programs, seeking 
methodological and technical support from competent third 
parties, and establishing dispute settlement mechanisms.185  
While member states can voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of 
ICJ or agree to resolve disputes via arbitration, they have further 
adopted a non-adversarial and assistance-oriented compliance 
monitoring mechanism, which allows states to bring issues of 
non-compliance before an Implementation Committee to seek its 
recommendations.186  Compared to the non-compliance 
mechanism established under the Aarhus Convention, non-state 
actors have not yet been able to be directly involved under this 
mechanism.187 
With regard to the MRC regime, however, there is no self-
reporting system introduced, and information exchange focuses 
more on scientific data rather than relevant domestic legislation 
and policies.  In addition, considering the contents of the MRC 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement, it 
is likely that the future TEIA document will pay more attention 
to technical issues regarding how to carry out this process via the 
MRC institutions instead of dealing with non-compliance 
situations.  Other than the lack of necessary information 
exchange on domestic implementation, the MRC regime also 
suffers from the ambiguity of the Mekong Agreement itself and 
 
 184. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory 
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 391 (2000). 
 185. Convention on EIA, supra note 120, arts. 8, 9, 11, 15. 
 186. CRAIK, supra note 23, at 160. 
 187. Id. 
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the sole reliance on consensus building (underpinned by the 
“ASEAN Way”) or mediation to settle disputes.  These problems 
also widely exist in other cooperative regimes in the region.  
Dialogue relationships between China and the MRC and ASEAN 
are even less systematic, and the structure of the GMS program 
remains very loose. 
Further, a major difficulty in addressing the above issues 
also lies in the donor-driven feature of the MRC and its 
increasingly marginalized situation, resulting in the passive 
involvement of the lower Mekong countries (particularly Laos) 
and the MRC’s limited impact on hydropower decision-making.  
Introducing TEIA as a mechanism or a tool under the MRC 
regime is different from developing a new regional regime to 
address this issue, and the pre-existing deficiencies of the general 
compliance system of the MRC will be very difficult to overcome.  
Therefore, future discussions on the non-compliance mechanism 
for TEIA in the MRB context will probably not lead to a 
breakthrough in this aspect.  Another fundamental challenge is 
that none of the MRC procedural documents are legally-binding 
documents.  Accordingly, there is unfortunately no hard law 
foundation for any kind of compliance mechanism if the TEIA 
mechanism will be introduced in this way. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that at least more active 
information exchange on relevant domestic policy and 
experiences and a self-reporting evaluation system are relatively 
less-controversial compared to others.  In addition, scientific 
services and research is another approach to assist the EIA 
implementation of the Mekong countries.  A direct approach of 
implementing international commitments on TEIA is to 
incorporate the international requirements into domestic EIA 
procedures.  For example, the domestic EIA legislation can 
include the transboundary impact, which is now being considered 
by the experts in drafting the Cambodian new EIA Law.  Aside 
from this, administrative or other measures should be taken to 
incorporate TEIA commitments into national policies, programs, 
or strategies, but the degree of implementation via domestic 
measures largely depends on the influences of the MRC on 
domestic policies and legislation in general. 
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Relevant to compliance, a more fundamental question is how 
to ensure the effectiveness of the TEIA procedure.  Once a TEIA 
document is incorporated under the MRC regime, it is less likely 
that there will be obvious violations of these requirements, 
especially when the provisions are ambiguous.  Even if countries 
complied with the procedural document, the effectiveness of a 
TEIA in avoiding and addressing environmental disputes should 
not be over-exaggerated.  However, it certainly provides another 
valuable opportunity to engage with the affected states and their 
citizens.  It remains the most feasible and reliable approach to 
evaluate the potential transboundary environmental impact of a 
proposed project. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
TEIA is not a purely legal issue.  Instead, political and 
scientific factors have strong influences on a TEIA in practice.  
From the legal perspective, the major task is to provide suitable 
arrangements for such factors to work properly towards a more 
cooperative decision-making process and a more benign 
environmental outcome. 
Although the existence of some forms of EIA legislation in 
most of the Mekong countries can at least provide a basic 
foundation for regional negotiations on TEIA, the general 
effectiveness of domestic EIA in this region remains far from 
satisfactory, and the deficiencies of relevant legislation still needs 
to be improved.  This is particularly true with regard to issues 
like consideration of alternatives and the public’s right to be 
notified and to participate.  At the regional level, the promotion of 
TEIA under the MRC should certainly be considered as a priority, 
especially given the urgent situation of Mekong mainstream 
hydropower development. 
TEIA has two tendencies of development in practice.  It 
should be admitted that there is a high risk that it could be 
strongly influenced by national interests and end up as a mere 
formality to go through to justify a state’s behavior.  However, 
there is also a good chance that through the TEIA process, the 
right of access to information and public participation could be 
enhanced, so that civil society can be actively involved into the 
decision-making process.  Only by increasing transparency and 
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involving the public effectively, can a TEIA get beyond 
justification of dams into actual analysis of environmental 
impact. 
TEIA can be established at two levels: namely as a basic 
notion and framework, or as an institution with more detailed 
arrangements.  The former is a more realistic target for relevant 
negotiations under other regional platforms, while the latter may 
be pursued, at least partly, under the MRC regime.  In addition to 
access to information and public participation, it is necessary to 
integrate TEIA with the mechanisms of information exchange 
and notification and consultation.  Despite the realistic 
considerations, bolder proposals on future TEIA agreement 
should not be completely rejected and the cooperation with other 
international organizations, regions, and countries should be 
welcomed. 
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